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Abstract 
 
 Current Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) designs require multiple operators for each 
vehicle, partly due to imperfect automation matched with the complex operational environment.  
This study examines the effectiveness of future UAS automation by explicitly addressing the 
human/machine trust relationship during system architecting.  A pedigreed engineering model of 
trust between human and machine was developed and applied to a laboratory-developed micro-
UAS for Special Operations.  This unprecedented investigation answered three primary 
questions.  Can previous research be used to create a useful trust model for systems engineering?  
How can trust be considered explicitly within the DoD Architecture Framework?  Can the utility 
of architecting trust be demonstrated on a given UAS architecture?  By addressing operator trust 
explicitly during architecture development, system designers can incorporate more effective 
automation.   The results provide the Systems Engineering community a new modeling technique 
for early human systems integration. 
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Architecting Human Operator Trust in Automation to Improve System 
Effectiveness in Multiple Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Control 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) have attained a prominent role in Joint warfighting 
over the last ten years, particularly in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI 
FREEDOM.  While the air vehicles themselves are uninhabited, it is a fallacy to believe that 
humans are a less important component of the overall UAS than of any other aerial systems.  In 
fact, some current UAS designs require multiple operators for each vehicle, largely due to the 
limited ability of existing automation to respond effectively to the complexity of the operational 
environment. 
On December 6, 1999, a U.S. Air Force Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 
ran off a runway at Edwards Air Force Base causing extensive damage to the vehicle.  One of the 
contributing factors to the crash was overreliance on the system’s automation.  The UAV 
experienced an in-flight problem with the onboard temperature regulation system within the 
avionics compartment.  The aircraft was commanded to return to base and the system’s 
automation implemented a secondary contingency plan to conduct an automated landing and 
taxi.  The preprogrammed automation instructed the aircraft to accelerate to a speed of 155 knots 
between any two waypoints if the altitude between the points varied by more than a pre-specified 
amount.  Unbeknown to the operators, two of the waypoints on the taxi path exceeded the 
threshold and the aircraft accelerated to a speed where it was unable to negotiate a turn and ran 
off the runway (Williams, 2006).   
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Human operators under-relying on the Global Hawk UAV automation is another problem 
that is currently plaguing the platform, negatively impacting the effectiveness of the system.  
Based on crew interviews conducted in September 2008 at Beale Air Force Base, CA, current 
training emphasizes the need for operators to check the dialogue box on the system display after 
each command is given in order to ensure that the air vehicle is functioning as commanded.  
However, there is no confirmation from the air vehicle that a command was received until the 
aircraft is observed to execute the command.  This lack of feedback from the automation or 
knowledge of its state causes operators to double check their work, which takes time and 
increases the cognitive workload of the operator.  In addition, the operator’s focus is diverted 
from other critical tasks during this period in order to develop sufficient situational awareness of 
system behavior to determine whether intervention is required (Cummings & Mitchell, 2008). 
These two cases exemplify the fact that human operators have a tendency to either over 
rely or under rely on a system’s automation.  Underutilizing the automation increases the 
cognitive workload of the operator, which can adversely affect their ability to perform 
effectively.  Over relying on the automation can have drastic consequences, including damage to 
or loss of the air vehicle.  Therefore, it is essential that future systems are designed to provide the 
appropriate level and type of automation to facilitate collaboration between the human and the 
machine counterpart.  In accomplishing this task, emphasis should be placed on the interaction 
between the human and machine, in order to create an environment that fosters an appropriate 
level of trust by the human operator(s), as will be discussed below. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
As the demand for UAS capability has grown, the Air Force’s ability to produce mission-
ready operators for these specialized systems has been stressed.  This highlights one of the 
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primary emphases within the Human Systems Integration (HSI) community.  The community is 
accentuating the need to account for the human as part of the system during early system design 
to make system operation more effective and efficient.  Rather than many operators per vehicle, 
future systems should incorporate effective automation to allow a single operator to control 
multiple vehicles performing a variety of tasks, potentially in synchronization, in a fluid 
operational environment.  The challenge is to have the appropriate number of people with respect 
to the cognitive tasks. 
Automation is “the technology that actively selects data, transforms information, makes 
decisions, or controls processes” (Lee & See, 2004).  However, a large body of research shows 
that more automation is not necessarily better automation (Parasuraman, Barnes, & Cosenzo, 
2007).  In order to be effective, the automation must be well-designed, reliable, and tailored to 
complement the capabilities of the human operator in varying supervisory roles (Cummings, 
Bruni, Mercier, & Mitchell, 2007) (Cummings & Mitchell, 2008). 
The best automation, however, is ineffective if not used or used improperly.  In this 
regard, the operator’s level of trust in the automation is a vital factor in determining its 
operational effectiveness.  This form of trust is also known as social or "pragmatic" trust due to 
its analog in human cognition (Konstantinou, Liagkou, Spirakis, Stamatiou, & Yung, 2005), as 
opposed to “trust” in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and other security related aspects of 
automated systems. Pragmatic trust, which is the focus of this research effort, can be defined as 
the attitude that an agent will help achieve an individual’s goals in a situation characterized by 
uncertainty and vulnerability (Lee & See, 2004).  If a human operator trusts automation 
inappropriately and the automation fails, effectiveness is reduced; sometimes catastrophically.  
Conversely, if the operator chooses not to trust the automation and instead controls the system 
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manually, human error and inefficiency can reduce effectiveness.  Realistic trust that reflects the 
true capabilities of the automation enables maximum effectiveness for a given system.  The 
authors of this research developed the following diagram to portray such a relationship between 
operator trust and mission effectiveness.  
    
Figure 1 – Realistic Trust Enables Maximal Effectiveness 
One problem is that trust, as with many aspects of human cognition, is difficult to 
quantify.  If a robust metric existed for trust, systems engineers and program managers could use 
it to evaluate competing system designs.  The lack of human performance metrics has been 
repeatedly noted in research on Human Systems Integration, which is “the interdisciplinary 
technical and management processes for integrating human considerations within and across all 
system elements” (INCOSE, August 2007).  The community consensus is that better quantitative 
tools and methods are required in order to fully address this shortfall (Committee on Human-
System Design Support for Changing Technology, 2007).  Previous research efforts have 
identified common factors that influence trust (Antifakos, Kern, Schiele, & Schwaninger, 2005); 
(Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2008); (Dzindolet, Peterson, Pomranky, Pierce, & Beck, 
2003), while others have proposed mathematical models of trust (Lee & See, 2004); 
(Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, 1998); (Cohen, Parasuraman, & Freeman, 1998) and have 
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attempted to measure trust empirically (Jian, Bisantz, & Drury, 2000).  Building on this body of 
work, it may be possible now to improve overall mission effectiveness by explicitly designing 
systems to elicit appropriate levels of trust in UAS automation. 
1.3 Objectives 
This research will attempt to answer three main questions: 
• Can previous research be used to create a useful trust model for systems engineering?  
• How can trust be considered explicitly within the DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) 
in order to improve the effectiveness and suitability of future UAS designs? 
• Can the utility of architecting trust be demonstrated on a given UAS architecture? 
Results can then be used by capability planners and early DoD acquisition processes in 
order to address trust factors explicitly during design, thereby improving the effectiveness of 
automation in UAS architectures. 
1.4 Scope and Assumptions 
Trust has been the focus of myriad studies in numerous disciplines.  This thesis cannot 
possibly encompass all previous work related to trust, nor address trust for all situations humans 
may encounter.  Rather, it will focus on architecting trust in the context of effective UAS control.  
This effort will focus on architecting trust by adapting existing research to (1) determine how 
trust manifests in various aspects of UAS architecture, and (2) how each factor can be addressed 
to foster an appropriate level of operator trust in the system. 
 Several assertions must be made to effectively address trust within a system architecture.  
The first is that trust is not self-contained or binary, but rather is composed of a set of cognitive 
inputs that act in combination and along a continuum.  The second is that, while there will be 
some variance between individuals, humans will tend to respond to those inputs in ways similar 
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enough to predict.  This predicted response will be especially true of military operators with 
common training, organization, and ethos.  Lastly, while the fundamental physical mechanisms 
of human cognition are not completely understood, the effects of human cognition on decision-
making can be quantified.  These assertions are supported by decades of empirical evidence from 
trust-related research, which will be described in Chapter 2. 
1.5 Thesis Overview 
 Chapter 2 will provide an overview of the extensive body of work related to trust in 
automation and will also describe the fundamentals of UAS automation with an emphasis on 
factors that affect operator trust.  Chapter 3 will provide a detailed analysis of trust and its 
component elements through the development of a systems engineering model of trust.  In 
addition, Chapter 3 will introduce the Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) 
and related architecture development concepts.   Chapter 4 will depict the application of the trust 
lens to the architecture process and demonstrate its applicability to improve the architecture of an 
existing UAS.  Chapter 5 will summarize our findings and identify recommendations for further 
research.  
 7 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Overview and Scope 
 As previously stated, trust relationships have been extensively researched across many 
disciplines, including psychology, human factors, ergonomics, management, and systems 
engineering.  Much of the large body of research on the topic has dealt with human-human trust.  
Yet, as we interact with automation more and more frequently in our daily lives, the topic of 
human-machine trust has steadily gained importance.  Human-machine trust is especially 
relevant in operations involving UAS, because human operators are almost entirely reliant on 
system feedback due to their physical separation from the air vehicle.  What follows is a targeted 
summary of those works most directly relevant to the thesis objectives: identifying trust factors 
inherent in single-operator multi-UAV control and considering those factors explicitly when 
developing UAS architectures. 
Research related to human performance and interaction with automation began as early as 
the 1960s (Senders, 1964); (Fitts & Posner, 1967) and began to focus on automation reliability 
and resulting human operator trust in the 1970s (Halpin, Johnson, & Thornberry, 1973).  
Subsequent research focused on identifying social and psychological factors that influenced trust 
(Barber, 1983), categorizing user acceptance or rejection of unfamiliar automation in industrial 
applications (Zuboff, 1988) and analyzing the trustworthiness of automation (Sheridan, 1988).  
More recently, researchers have attempted to identify and model the relationships of factors that 
influence operator trust, (Muir, 1994) (Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, 1998) (Cohen, 
Parasuraman, & Freeman, 1998), to measure trust empirically (Jian, Bisantz, & Drury, 2000), 
and to predict operators’ tendency to trust and rely on automation under various conditions 
(Bisantz & Seong, 2001) (Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, Dawe, & Anderson, 2001) (Dzindolet, 
Peterson, Pomranky, Pierce, & Beck, 2003) (Gao & Lee, 2006).  These and similar works 
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defined the parameters of trust, such as the concepts of appropriate trust, misuse, disuse, 
reliability, and others, which will be reviewed shortly.  Lee & See (2004) summarized these and 
roughly 200 other published works on trust, and proposed specific recommendations to enable 
designers to elicit appropriate operator reliance on automation.  Lee & See’s findings provide a 
framework for much of the remainder of this chapter. 
 Most recently, two studies have proposed automation design guidelines for a single 
operator/multiple UAV system (Cummings & Mitchell, 2008) (Cummings, Bruni, Mercier, & 
Mitchell, 2007).  These studies did not address trust explicitly, but examined situational 
awareness and attention; therefore they present an opportunity to apply the concepts from this 
chapter. 
2.2 Trust and its Parameters 
 The definition of trust varies depending on the context in which it is used, as has been 
illustrated by much of the early research on the subject.  Bhattacharya et al. (1998) established 
several characteristics useful in defining trust:  First, trust exists in an uncertain and risky 
environment, and is unnecessary when certainty exists.  Second, trust represents an expectancy 
by the trustor that reflects some aspect of predictability.  Third, any definition of trust must 
account for trust’s strength and importance, where strength reflects the degree of confidence the 
trustor has in the expected outcome, and importance represents the value of the expected 
outcome to the trustor.  Fourth, trust is situation and person specific.  And last, trust reflects the 
degree of expectation of a positive outcome (Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, 1998).  In 
short, whether the trustee “agent” is automated or human trust has been defined as: 
“the attitude that an agent will help achieve an individual’s goals in a situation 
characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability.” (Lee & See, 2004) 
 9 
 
 It is important to draw a distinction between trust and reliance.  Trust is an attitude, and 
reliance is a behavior reflecting an intention or willingness to act.  According to Lee & See 
(2004), “trust stands between beliefs about the characteristics of the automation and the intent to 
rely on the automation.”  Further, “trust guides – but does not completely determine – reliance.” 
2.2.1 Trust Dependencies 
 Trust and trustworthiness are not innate qualities, but rather depend on many factors.  As 
mentioned previously, trust is situation and person specific, and often varies over time.  Yet, 
common elements appear repeatedly in the literature regarding trust. 
2.2.1.1 Environment and Context 
The environment in which automation is being used plays an important role in an 
operator’s need to trust.  The environment’s importance is highlighted by the Human Systems 
Integration (HSI) community that classifies environment as one of the nine primary HSI 
domains.  As discussed by Bhattacharya, et al. (1998), trust is unnecessary when outcomes are 
certain.  Conversely, trust is an important factor in highly uncertain and risky environments, 
where decisions must be made quickly with imperfect information.  In such situations, an 
individual’s propensity to trust is shaped by individual, cultural, and organizational context.   
Cultural and organizational contexts influence trust as individuals interact in ways that 
inform them about the trustworthiness of others and by establishing general norms and expected 
behaviors.  Individual context refers to a specific person’s history of interactions with the trustee 
and their general inclination to trust, which can vary from one individual to the next.   
Individual variation in tendency to trust is important to consider when evaluating 
automation, since variations may affect reliance in ways that are not directly related to the 
characteristics of the automation.  While this must be taken into account by designers, previous 
 10 
 
research has shown that trust tendency as a personality trait can be reliably measured, and that 
the trust tendency influences behavior in predictable ways (Lee & See, 2004). 
2.2.1.2 Actions Taken 
Actors (be they human or machine) engage in actions intended to produce specific results 
and these individual decisions and actions act together to produce outcomes.  However, since 
causality can be difficult to determine in an uncertain environment, it is not always possible to 
predict the consequences of alternative courses of action.  In some situations, one individual will 
know the outcome of the other’s action before being required to act, while in other situations 
each must act simultaneously or without knowledge of the consequences of each other’s actions.  
In either case, individuals will predict the other’s action and subjectively assign it a probability.  
This probability represents the strength of their expectation, or level of confidence in the 
trustee’s predictability (Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, 1998).  High predictability is a major 
factor in fostering trust in automation, since it allows a trustor to establish accurate expectations 
of the automation’s capability and behavior. 
2.2.1.3 Outcomes and Consequences 
“Clearly, trust concerns an expectancy or an attitude regarding the likelihood of favorable 
responses” (Lee & See, 2004).  In addition to predicting a specific action, individuals will also 
assign a probability that the actions taken by the other will be appropriate and effective toward 
achieving the desired outcome.  This prediction is influenced by the degree of importance the 
individual attaches to achieving a specific outcome, which is often related to the perceived 
consequences of success or failure.  Achievement or failure to attain a favorable outcome affects 
future trust by creating, reinforcing, or refuting expectations of the trustee’s competence 
(Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, 1998).  For example, the crash of a multimillion dollar 
UAV usually generates intense pressure to isolate and correct the cause.  Until that is done, UAV 
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operators may lose trust in the system.  Interestingly, though, some studies have shown that high 
complacency individuals, or those with high levels of trust in automation, were actually more 
successful in making accurate predictions, and thus more likely to detect automation failures as 
they happened, than low-trust individuals (Lee & See, 2004). 
 2.2.1.4 Information about Trustee 
Bhattacharya et al. (1995) describe trust as a multidimensional construct that is based on 
trustee characteristics.  The relevant trustee characteristics are any that inform the individual 
about the ability of the trustee to achieve the trustor’s goals. These include the nature, 
competence, and trustworthiness of the trustee, among other factors.  One of the major questions 
is “what is to be trusted?”  This is also known as specificity which is “the degree to which trust 
corresponds to a particular component or aspect of the trustee.” For example, an operator may 
have different levels of trust for a system as a whole than for a specific mode of a given 
subsystem. (Lee & See, 2004) 
2.2.1.5 Operator Perception 
 Operator perception can influence trust and affect reliance in many ways.  Beliefs and 
perceptions are part of the information base that determines the attitudes that affect operator trust 
and reliance.   Self-confidence, perceived mental workload, situational awareness, and time 
stress are the major perceptions that an operator will create that will directly influence his/her 
trust in the automation and reliance upon it. 
 Lee and See (2004) claim the level of trust combines with other attitudes and 
expectations, such as operator workload and self-confidence, to determine the intention to rely 
upon the automation of a system.  If an operator has low trust in the system and high self-
confidence, then they will tend to disuse the automation.  Likewise, if an operator has high trust 
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in system automation and their self-confidence is low, then they will tend to misuse the 
automation.  In general, individuals tend to rely more upon automation when their confidence in 
their own ability is lower than in the automation, and vice-versa.  These biases in self-confidence 
can have a substantial effect on the appropriate reliance on automation (Lee & See, 2004). 
 These results were demonstrated in a series of tests.  A study of a vehicle navigation aid 
found that system errors cause trust and reliance to decline more for those in a familiar city, 
whose self-confidence was high, as compared with those in an unfamiliar city, whose self-
confidence was low (Lee & See, 2004).  Likewise, in a study between pilots and students, 
students were found to have more self-confidence and therefore were less inclined to use the 
given automation than were the pilots who were familiar with the automation and tended to rely 
upon it more (Lee & See, 2004). 
Mental workload can be described as the relation between the function relating the 
mental resources of a task and those resources available to be supplied by the human operator 
(Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2008).  Human mental workload is paramount in 
developing a successful transition from current operations of many operators to one UAV to one 
operator controlling multiple UAVs.  The challenge in accomplishing this transition is to 
increase the level of system autonomy in an effective way that will reduce human workload 
(Cummings & Mitchell, 2008). 
 However, simply increasing system automation will not necessarily improve system 
performance through a reduction in mental workload.  In abnormal or unexpected situations, the 
automation could fail; possibly causing a catastrophic event to occur while the operator may not 
be engaged in the task (Cummings & Mitchell, 2008).  The lack of transparency and trust in the 
 13 
 
system can potentially lead to increased operator mental workload in attempting to determine 
whether or not the automation is working correctly and if intervention is required.  Therefore, 
architects should consider operator trust when evaluating levels and types of automation in order 
to reduce mental workload, wait times, interactions times, and queuing times, while improving 
the effectiveness of the system. 
  Cohen et al. (1998) also stressed the importance and relationship of mental 
workload/time stress and trust in decision making.  They proposed a direct trade-off exists with 
respect to time between trust and decision-making, as shown in Figure 2.  If an operator’s trust in 
the aid’s conclusion falls in the upper region, then the user should simply accept the conclusion 
without taking further time.  If the trust falls in the lower region, the user should reject the aid’s 
conclusion without further delay.  Finally, if trust falls in the intermediate region, then it is 
worthwhile for the user to take time to decide on a course of action. 
 
Figure 2 – Operators Verify Less as Time Stress Increases (Cohen, Parasuraman, & Freeman, 1998) 
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 The upper dashed line in the figure portrays the typical amount of trust an operator has in 
a particular automation over time.  In the beginning, the initial trust is typically low and depends 
upon factors such as context, predictability, and expectations.  The relationships between these 
factors will be explained in detail later in the chapter.  The user’s confidence in the automation 
typically increases as more information is collected and the trust relationship matures (Cohen, 
Parasuraman, & Freeman, 1998). 
 The key variables that influence the reliance decisions in the model above are uncertainty 
and time stress.  Time stress acts as the main cost of delay parameter in determining the upper 
and lower bounds on the figure.  As the Figure 2 depicts, action is more imperative when the cost 
of delay is great, even with high uncertainty about trust.  In addition, as time stress increases the 
upper and lower bounds move towards each other, indicating the need to make a decision with 
less verification at the same levels of trust (Cohen, Parasuraman, & Freeman, 1998). 
 Situational awareness (SA) is “the perception of the elements in the environment within a 
volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status 
in the near future” (Endsley & Garland, 2000).  SA is not a choice or action taken based upon 
presented information, or a consequence of the diagnosis, nor is it a measure of a human 
operator’s performance.  Instead, SA is the operator's mental model of the current and near-
future situation.  Studies have shown that SA varies inversely as the level of automation is 
increased and decreased in UAV operations.  Drury & Scott (2008) developed the following 
diagram, Figure 3, to portray this concept.   
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Figure 3 - Human Awareness Changes With Levels of Automation (Drury & Scott, 2008) 
 
As depicted, when the level of automation of a UAV increases, the level of information 
detail (LOID) and thus operator’s associated SA with regard to the UAV will tend to decrease.  
For example, the Global Hawk UAV is a highly automated air vehicle that has the ability to fly 
between pre-programmed way points, and therefore human operators need less SA of the 
aircraft’s flight-related information than operators would need of a low-automation Predator 
UAV pursuing a time sensitive target (Drury & Scott, 2008). 
Past research efforts have categorized SA into the following three levels: level 1 – 
perception of information, level 2 – comprehension of current situation, and level 3 – projection 
of future status.  Parasuraman et al.  (2008)  stress the notion that these levels can be accurately 
measured to provide an understanding of the SA that the current system automation is providing.  
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For example, visual scanning tools are commercially available to aid in the assessment of level 1 
SA (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2008). 
SA will also vary depending upon other factors such as an operator’s trust in the 
automation.  As mentioned earlier, as a system becomes more reliable, operators tend to develop 
more trust in the automation and have a tendency to develop an automation bias towards it.  
Previous research efforts have pointed to a correlation between automation bias and decreased 
SA.  Likewise, a lack of trust in automation tends to foster an environment where operators 
closely supervise the system, thus potentially increasing their SA with regards to the UAV 
operations (Cummings & Mitchell, 2008).  This illustrates a complex relationship that varies 
over time between perceptions like SA and mental workload, operator trust and its effect on 
reliance, and the resulting impact on mission effectiveness. 
2.2.2 Trust Bases / Expectations 
 The diverse and copious research that has been conducted in the area of trust has 
generated numerous definitions.  Many of these definitions focus on trust as an attitude or 
expectation that a human operator has towards the automation.  The group of researchers in this 
category have defined trust in some of the following ways: “expectation related to subjective 
probability an individual assigns to the occurrence to some set of future events”, “expectation of 
technically competent role performance”; or “expectations of fiduciary obligation and 
responsibility, that is, the expectation that some others in our social relationships have moral 
obligations and responsibility to demonstrate a special concern for others’ interests above their 
own” (Lee & See, 2004). 
Lee and See (2004) claim that trust evolves in a complex individual, cultural, and 
organizational context.  Within this context the role of expectations plays a vital part.  For 
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example, they state that the individual follows a social learning approach in which expectations 
for a particular situation are determined by specific previous experiences with situations that are 
perceived as similar.  They also report that trust is a generalized expectancy that is independent 
of specific experiences, but rather based on the generalization of a large number of diverse 
experiences (Lee & See, 2004).  In other words, the prior experiences an individual brings into a 
trust relationship help to shape his/her expectations of the trustee, and those expectations are 
likely to affect the operator’s future interaction with the trustee.  This illustrates the iterative and 
evolving nature of trust. 
Likewise, Lee and See (2004) state that the organizational context reflects the 
interactions between people that inform them about the trustworthiness of others, which can 
include reputation and gossip, while the social context is comprised of a set of norms and 
expectations.  Therefore, individuals enter into arrangements with each other, or with sources of 
automation, with a predetermined level of trust based upon these contexts.  For example, Lee and 
See (2004) assert that people will initially trust an engineer not because of the ability of any 
specific person, but because of the underlying education and regulatory structure that governs 
people in the role of an engineer.  In other words, they trust because of an expectation that an 
engineer has earned some measure of trust by virtue of professional competence. 
Bonnie Muir (1994), meanwhile, states that a human operator’s decision to allow (or 
conversely override) automation to control a process demonstrates a certain level of trust in the 
automation.  Therefore, it is necessary to have an appropriate model of trust in human-machine 
interaction to provide a basis for developing effective automation.  The model presented in this 
research assumes a definition of trust consistent with Lee and See and expands it by describing 
the multidimensional character of trust, including three specific bases, or expectations: technical 
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competence, persistence, and fiduciary responsibility (Barber, 1983).  These bases appear similar 
in concept to those described by Lee & See (2004) as ability, integrity, and benevolence. 
2.2.2.1 Technical Competence / Ability 
Technical competence simply means that the trustor believes the trustee has the ability to 
perform the assigned task successfully (Muir, 1994).  Lee & See (2004) define ability as “the 
group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable the trustee to influence the 
domain.”  The trustor’s perception of the trustee’s ability, as well as similar characteristics such 
as reliability and predictability, contribute to some expectation of performance, which is a 
primary component of trust especially in the early stage of a trust relationship.  Section 2.2.3 will 
discuss performance’s relationship to trust. 
2.2.2.2 Persistence / Integrity 
 Persistence refers to an expectation of constancy, which, for example, allows the operator 
to construct a mental model of the automation through experience interacting with it.  (Muir, 
1994)  This is similar to integrity, which Lee & See (2004) define as “the degree to which the 
trustee adheres to a set of principles the trustor finds acceptable.”  A trustor’s perception of the 
trustee’s integrity can be considered to derive from observations of ability over a prolonged 
period, and affords the trustor an expectation of dependability, which is another primary dynamic 
of trust, described in section 2.2.3. 
2.2.2.3 Fiduciary Responsibility / Benevolence  
Finally, fiduciary responsibility applies when trustee competence is unknown, and the 
trustor must assume the trustee will act appropriately.  This often occurs when an operator 
assumes a system will meet its design-based performance criteria when it is operating as 
intended (Muir, Trust in Automation: Part I. Theoretical issues in the study of trust and human 
intervention in automated systems, 1994).  This is similar to Lee and See’s (2004) term 
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benevolence, which they define as “the extent to which the intents and motivations of the trustee 
are aligned with those of the trustor.”  In a mature trust relationship, the trustor’s perception of 
trustee benevolence prompts faith, which is a judgment that the trustee can be relied on, even 
though specific actions and their outcomes may be unknown at the time. 
2.2.3 Trust Dynamics / Influences 
 In addition to these three bases (persistence/integrity, competence/ability, and fiduciary 
responsibility/benevolence); Muir identifies three dynamics of trust: predictability, 
dependability, and faith (Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985).  These dynamics appear consistent 
with Lee and See’s (2004) factors of performance, process, and purpose.  Each of these dynamics 
applies to greater or lesser degrees depending on the maturity of the trust relationship, and each 
requires varying amounts and types of information in order to sustain appropriate trust. 
2.2.3.1 Predictability  
 Predictability is important in the early stages of a trust relationship, and requires visibility 
of specific behaviors, or performance.  For example, operators will judge automation based on its 
ability to deliver consistent and desirable results.  However, several factors influence 
predictability judgments.  First is actual predictability: the automation’s performance.  Lee & See 
(2004) describe performance as “what the automation does.  More specifically, performance 
refers to the competency or expertise as demonstrated by its ability to achieve the operator’s 
goals.”  Next is perceived predictability, or transparency.  The operator must be able to observe 
the automation’s behavior in order to estimate predictability.  In general, simple automation will 
be more predictable and observable than automation that has many degrees of freedom.  Lastly, 
the stability of the environment may affect predictability, since an unstable environment may 
cause difficulty for an operator to distinguish apparent unpredictability, which should be ignored, 
from inherent unpredictability, which should reduce trust (Muir, 1994).  During developmental 
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and operational testing, testers carefully measure the performance of system components and 
conduct repeated, controlled trials to isolate all possible variables, in order to minimize apparent 
unpredictability.  However, exercising all variables is not possible in the operational 
environment. Operators must rely on built-in transparency, realistic training, and prior 
experience to accurately predict system behavior. 
2.2.3.2 Dependability  
 As the trust relationship matures, focus changes from specific behaviors to an assessment 
of general dependability, or the extent to which the trustee can be relied upon.  Operators who 
are familiar with the automation will begin to trust based on overall experience rather than 
specific behaviors, and will have a greater understanding of the situations in which the 
automation may be untrustworthy.  Lee & See (2004) describe this tendency in terms of process, 
which is “the degree to which the automation’s algorithms are appropriate for the situation and 
able to achieve the operator’s goals.”  Operator judgment of automation dependability is 
enhanced when operators push the boundaries of the automation’s capabilities into uncertain and 
risky scenarios, allowing them to observe how the automation reacts beyond its design limits 
(Muir, 1994).  This “pushing the envelope” often happens during test & evaluation or training, 
but may also occur in the operational environment.  In sum, Lee & See (2004) assert that 
“operators will trust the automation if its algorithms can be understood and seem capable of 
achieving the operator’s goals in the current situation.”  This assertion is reinforced by inferences 
the operator draws by observing the automation’s performance over a period of time. 
2.2.3.3 Faith  
 In the final stage, faith represents a fully mature trust relationship.  Here, faith is defined 
as “a closure against doubt in the face of an uncertain future.”   In this stage, the operator’s 
perception of the appropriateness and flexibility of the automation allows him to control the 
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system effectively, even without a complete understanding of the automation’s complex 
behavior.  Faith, in this context, is similar to purpose, which Lee & See (2004) define as “the 
degree to which the automation is being used within the realm of the designer’s intent.”  This 
assumes the designer’s intent has been communicated to the operator.  However, the operator 
also realizes the potential for unforeseen interactions and the limitations inherent in any 
mitigating procedures (Muir, 1994). 
2.2.4 Muir’s Model 
The integrated model of the relationship between automation, the operator’s trust, and 
predictions about the automation’s behavior developed by Muir (1994) is depicted in Figure 4.  
This model depicts the multidimensional trust construct.  As previously discussed, human 
operator’s expectation of the automation’s persistence, competence, and responsibility plays an 
important role in establishing the initial level of trust in the automation.  In addition, system and 
operator confidence is related to the plausibility of the inferences made.  In this context, 
confidence refers to a level of expectation associated with a particular prediction, rather than the 
overall trust relationship.    Muir's model allows a qualitative assessment of the appropriateness 
of operator trust in a given system or component (Muir, 1994). 
 22 
 
 
 
Figure 4 - Muir's Model of Trust (1994) 
 
2.3 Reliance 
Many studies have demonstrated that in terms of man-machine interaction, “trust is an 
attitude toward automation that affects reliance and … can be measured consistently”  (Lee & 
See, 2004).  While others have characterized trust as an intention or willingness to act, Lee & 
See (2004) assert that trust is an attitude that affects reliance.  In this context, reliance is the 
operator’s intention or willingness to act, in the form of a decision to use or not to use 
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automation.  While trust is not the only influence on operator reliance, it is a key factor “when 
the complexity of the automation makes a complete understanding impractical and when the 
situation demands adaptive behavior that procedures cannot guide” (Lee & See, 2004).  These 
conditions often result in inappropriate reliance, which falls generally into two categories: 
misuse and disuse (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).  Misuse refers to failures that occur when 
operators rely on automation in excess of its capabilities, i.e. over-trust.  Disuse refers to operator 
rejection of automation when it is capable, i.e. under-trust. 
2.3.1 Misuse 
Human operators will tend to rely more upon automation as its reliability and their 
understanding of the automation increases.  In some cases, this can lead to overreliance, or 
automation bias.  Automation bias is a decision bias that occurs when operators become over-
reliant on the automation and do not verify the accuracy of automated recommendations.  This 
situation could lead to complacency and erroneous, if not catastrophic, errors (Cummings, Bruni, 
Mercier, & Mitchell, 2007). 
 Very high levels of trust in automation that are not perfectly reliable can be associated 
with overreliance and failure to monitor the “raw” information sources that provide input to the 
automated system.  This phenomenon is known as complacency (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & 
Wickens, 2008).  For example, if operators are given a tool to measure these “raw” information 
sources, complacency can be measured by evaluating whether or not the operator uses the tool 
more or less often under automation than under manual control.  Complacency, as reflected by a 
strategy of allocating attention away from the automated task to other concurrent tasks, can be 
measured using eye recording devices.  Using this approach, the eye movement recordings 
should show that operators scan the raw information sources less frequently when using 
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automation than when performing the task manually or less frequently when automation 
reliability is higher than lower (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2008). 
 This concept was demonstrated in a study by Senders (1964).  In his research, he showed 
that human observers tasked with monitoring for abnormal readings on multiple dials with 
different frequencies of changing values made eye movements to the dials in proportion to 
bandwidth (Senders, 1964).  Moray and Inagaki expanded on this study suggesting that a human 
operator who monitored automation at a rate less than the optimal Nyquist frequency (which 
represents a sampling rate twice that of the highest frequency present in the sampled data) was 
complacent while the one who monitored at a greater rate was skeptical.  Individuals monitoring 
at the Nyquist rate are considered to be well calibrated (Moray & Inagaki, 2000).  This approach 
may provide system engineers a proxy measure for trust; however, its applicability in design still 
needs to be proven. 
2.3.2 Disuse 
 Past studies of human-machine interaction have shown that under-reliance, or disuse, 
tends to be less common than misuse in many situations (Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, Dawe, & 
Anderson, 2001).  When disuse does occur, it reduces the benefits technology offers and can 
negatively impact mission effectiveness (Pina, Donmez, & Cummings, 2008).  Disuse is most 
commonly caused by false alarms, which reduce operator trust over time and increase workload 
(Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).  Disuse due to false alarms can be decreased through training, 
specifically by providing the operator knowledge of the automation’s error rate (Dzindolet, 
Pierce, Beck, Dawe, & Anderson, 2001).  However, not all disuse is trust-induced.  Design and 
ease of use are also factors, as in cases where automation requires substantial time to configure 
and activate.  An operator under time constraint or high workload may choose not to rely on 
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automation for these reasons, even though the automation is highly trusted to produce effective 
results (Lee & See, 2004).  For example, a pilot concentrating on landing an aircraft may be 
inclined to disuse its flight management system if air traffic control changes require the 
automation to be reprogrammed during the last minutes of final descent. (Parasuraman, Barnes, 
& Cosenzo, 2007) 
2.3.3 Reliance Mismatch Factors 
Appropriate reliance exists when the operator’s level of trust in the automation matches 
the automation’s true capabilities, which may not be clearly or accurately understood by the 
operator.  (Improving this relationship is a key goal of this research.)  Mismatches between 
operator trust and automation capability can be described in terms of three factors: calibration, 
resolution, and specificity (Lee & See, 2004).  Calibration is the direct correlation between the 
operator’s trust and the automation’s capability, similar to misuse/disuse (Lee & Moray, 1994); 
(Muir, 1987).  Resolution is the degree to which changes in automation capability affect operator 
trust (Cohen, Parasuraman, & Freeman, 1998).  For example, with low resolution, a large change 
in capability will have little effect on trust.  Lastly, specificity refers to the degree to which trust 
correlates to a specific component or aspect of the automation.  Specificity can be further 
differentiated as functional, in which trust is modulated by specific functions, sub-functions, and 
modes of operation, and temporal, in which trust is modulated by changes in context that affect 
the automation’s capability (Lee & See, 2004). 
The objective is for the operator to have good calibration, high resolution, and high 
specificity in order to achieve appropriate trust.  Lee & See (2004) contend that these principles 
should “guide design, evaluation, and training to enhance human-automation partnerships.” 
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2.4 Design Recommendations for Incorporating Trust 
2.4.1 Use Adaptive Automation 
Cummings et al. (2007) present different levels of automation based on those developed 
by Parasuraman et al. (2000) in order to conduct a trade study to determine the benefits and 
shortfalls of each in regard for single operator, multiple UAV command and control.  One of the 
levels of automation they present is management-by-exception.  This level occurs when 
automation decides to take an action based on some set of pre-determined criteria, and only gives 
operators a chance to veto the automation’s decision  (Cummings, Bruni, Mercier, & Mitchell, 
2007).  Their findings portray management-by-exception as dangerous due to its tendency to 
foster an automation bias atmosphere. 
This condition of automation bias, or overreliance, was one of the critical contributing 
factors that led to fratricide during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  In 2004, a U.S. Army Patriot 
System engaged and shot down a British Tornado and an American F/A-18.  The system was 
designed to use a management-by-exception automation where operators were given 15 seconds 
to veto an automation decision.  In this case, the system was highly complex, confusing, and 
comprised of often incorrect displays (Cummings, Bruni, Mercier, & Mitchell, 2007).  This 
situation led the operators to become over reliant upon the automation and they failed to veto the 
computer’s decision, which resulted in three coalition deaths. 
If, instead, the automation adapts to the needs of the operator in a given situation, mission 
effectiveness can be enhanced by making the best use of human-machine collaboration.  
Parasuraman, et al. (2000) proposed a four-stage model of human information processing, 
composed of information acquisition, information analysis, decision and action selection, and 
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action implementation.1
Figure 5
  They then proposed that these stages could benefit from different levels 
of automation, but that the specific implementation would be situation and application dependent 
(Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000).  For example, Parasuraman et al. (2007) simulated a 
combat identification system in which operators were asked to identify changes to a situation 
map.  They demonstrated that adaptive automation, which activated when operator performance 
fell below a threshold, improved SA and change detection while lowering mental workload.  
 depicts the results of the simulation (Parasuraman, Barnes, & Cosenzo, 2007). 
 
Figure 5 - Effects of Static and  Adaptive Automation on Change Detection, SA, and Workload (Parasuraman, Barnes and 
Cosenzo, 2007) 
Cummings, et al. (2007) extended this concept to single operator, multi-UAV control.  
They present a series of hierarchical control loops as shown in Figure 6, ranging from overall 
mission management, through navigation, to actual flight control, with outer loops depending on 
the correct functioning of the inner loops.  Each of these loops requires different degrees of 
                                                 
1 Note that this model is consistent with the dominant military command and control paradigm of 
Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. (Boyd, 1987) 
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interaction with the operator.  This necessitates a high degree of operator trust in the automation 
in the inner loops, because a single operator can only monitor the piloting of multiple vehicles, 
not control them manually.  Previous studies show that if reliability decreased with more 
vehicles present, trust declined.   However, trust improved when the human operator was 
involved in planning and executing decisions.  Even perfectly reliable automation, though, could 
not prevent a decrease in performance when workload increased (Cummings, Bruni, Mercier, & 
Mitchell, 2007). 
 
Figure 6 - Hierarchical Control Loops (Cummings, Bruni, Mercier, & Mitchell, 2007) 
 
2.4.2 Display System Confidence 
Context-aware systems may never attain 100% reliability since the context information 
that is needed to drive these systems is often incomplete, inaccessible, and/or uncertain.  
Therefore, the notion of trust between human operators and machines is necessary as operators 
tend to rely on certain properties of automation and develop a set of expectations of performance 
and behavior that can be greatly affected by the lack of a completely reliable system (Antifakos, 
Kern, Schiele, & Schwaninger, 2005).  Antifakos, et al. propose displaying system confidence in 
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order to help the human predict the outcome of the system and to use the system more 
effectively. 
 Antifakos et al. conducted a study to evaluate the effects of displaying system confidence 
on the user’s trust towards a context-aware mobile phone.  The study was conducted such that 
participants were evaluated on how much they relied on the context-aware systems.  Different 
videos that varied in situation, criticality, and cue-availability, were presented to the participants 
who were asked ‘In this situation, would you check the modality automatically selected by the 
system’ and instructed to rate the question on a continuous scale from “no” to “yes”.  In the 
study, trust was measured by capturing how often the user would verify a modality the system 
automatically derived (Antifakos, Kern, Schiele, & Schwaninger, 2005). 
 The results of the study demonstrated that system confidence had a statistical impact on 
how the user relied upon the system.  Figure 7 displays the results of the study.  The graph 
portrays that participants verified the setting made by the context-aware system less often when 
the confidence of the system was medium or high.  The verification rates tended to be higher 
with low system confidence, indicating that people inherently assume a confidence of above 0.5 
and thus felt the need to verify the system more (Antifakos, Kern, Schiele, & Schwaninger, 
2005). 
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Figure 7 - Antifakos, Kern, Schiele & Schwaninger, 2005 
 
2.5 Train for Appropriate Trust 
 Training, another HSI domain, is vital in conditioning operators to appropriately rely 
upon automation.  As we have seen, operator trust in automation is largely based on expectations 
about the automation’s ability, integrity, and benevolence.  It is critically important, especially 
when establishing initial trust (which depends primarily on predictability), that expectations be 
defined realistically. This can be done through direct elicitation using various methods, such as 
vignette framing.  In vignette framing, simplified scenarios are presented to expose participants 
to a particular situation or problem, and to elicit previously unstated expectations about the 
automation to be used in the scenario.  These expectations can then be addressed, confirmed or 
adjusted as need be (Miller, 2008). 
After initial expectations addressed, an operator must begin to interact with the system to 
develop proficiency.  During this early phase, training from more experienced users can 
influence trust in the automation through social and organizational context, and direct experience 
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will allow the operator to form an expectation of its reliability in various situations.  This trust 
will be context-specific because user expectations are reinforced or refuted in specific situations.  
The operator’s tendency to rely on the automation, or to act on a trust decision, will be based on 
uncertainty, time stress, and stakes. 
Uncertainty refers to resolution, which in turn depends on the completeness of the user’s 
understanding of system performance under given conditions.  If training improves system 
knowledge, it will reinforce appropriate trust and reduce the amount of time an operator spends 
verifying the system (Cohen, Parasuraman, & Freeman, 1998). 
Time stress, as the name implies, is the pressure to act quickly.  When time stress is high, 
an operator will act quickly even when trust is uncertain.  However, as discussed previously, 
under high time stress a user may choose not to rely on automation even if it is trusted, if that 
automation is too cumbersome to configure or engage.  Training can improve this tendency, if 
the operator becomes familiar enough with the automation to reduce configuration time (Cohen, 
Parasuraman, & Freeman, 1998). 
Stakes are consequences of a mistake.  These mistakes can be caused by either through 
disuse by incorrectly rejecting the automation, or misuse by accepting a false recommendation.  
As training improves an operator’s expectations of the system, trust should become more 
appropriate and the tendency of these errors should be reduced (Cohen, Parasuraman, & 
Freeman, 1998). 
Training should account for the three dynamics of trust described in Section 2.2.3 as 
Predictability, Dependability, and Faith.  In doing so, training should represent realistic system 
automation and operational scenarios.  While designers and trainers cannot anticipate all possible 
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situations an operator may face, experience with the system as close to its intended environment 
as possible will develop realistic expectations and engender appropriate trust in automation. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
The literature review summarized in Chapter 2 provides a common frame of reference to 
model trust and its relationship to reliance and mission effectiveness.  However, the 
multidisciplinary nature of trust and related concepts means that any trust model can be 
interpreted and critiqued by various communities in many different ways.  While several models 
of trust have been proposed, these efforts have not  produced a model that systems engineers can 
directly apply to integrate trust into system architectures such as those depicted within the DoD 
Architecture Framework, or DoDAF (DoDAF Version 1.5, 2007). 
The intent of this research is to develop a model that can inform and guide systems 
engineering efforts through a deeper understanding of operator trust in automation, trust’s 
influences, and trust’s effect on reliance decisions.  A second objective is to apply that model to 
an architecture for a specific purpose, namely UAV multi-mission management, to illustrate the 
model’s utility in enhancing system design to improve mission effectiveness. 
The resulting model is not intended to be understood from the perspective of an 
individual operator.  Rather, it is a depiction of part of the system's state at a given time, where 
the operator is an integral part of the man/machine system.  Thus, trust and other factors are 
properties of the system as a whole.  Using this model, a systems engineering team should be 
able to make design decisions specifically to develop and maintain appropriate operator trust in 
the automation.  They will be able  to consider trust explicitly when developing information 
exchange and data requirements, and establish measures of performance and/or effectiveness to 
evaluate the appropriateness of trust. 
Practical application of the model requires an adaptation of techniques developed by 
Majors Jonathan Zall and David O’Malley (2008) to incorporate cognition into the DoDAF.  
Together, these concepts may improve future single-operator multi-UAV system designs by 
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appropriately calibrating operator trust in automation.  Increased trust will improve mission 
effectiveness by reducing misuse and disuse of automation, allowing a more efficient distribution 
of effort between human and machine. 
3.1 Macro View of Trust Relationships 
The diagram shown in Figure 8 is useful for graphically summarizing the trust 
components and relationships.  Context and operator perception combine to form expectation, 
the primary inputs to trust.  Trust, as discussed previously, is an attitude that influences the 
reliance decision.  However, factors external to trust may also influence reliance on automation 
in certain situations: ease of use, operating procedures (which might also be considered part of 
context), and likely others.  A systems engineering model cannot include all possible influences 
on reliance, and henceforth the model being developed will not depict influences unrelated to 
trust.  However, the readers should understand that trust, while an important factor, is not the 
sole determinant of a reliance decision. 
 
 Figure 8 - Macro view of trust relationships 
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Reliance also influences the outcome of a particular decision.  Yet, as reliance may 
depend on factors other than trust, the outcome of an event also can depend on factors external to 
the reliance decision.  Other human, machine, and perhaps natural actors (e.g. birds) in the 
battlespace, differences between perception and ground truth, and other factors may also affect 
the outcome.  These factors will not be depicted in the trust model intended for application in the 
systems engineering process.  However, external factors can lead to a difference between 
apparent predictability and inherent predictability, which can incorrectly affect trust as discussed 
in section 2.2.3.1.  Therefore, it is important for engineers and operators to evaluate whether 
anomalous outcomes result from an incorrect reliance decision based on inappropriate trust, from 
external factors, or from both. 
It is particularly important during after-action analysis to determine when the operator 
accepted automation inappropriately (misused) or rejected automation inappropriately (disused).  
This information must be captured to the operator because achievement or failure of an expected 
outcome becomes part of an operator’s context for future situations involving trust.  When trust 
is appropriate and automation is relied on correctly, achievement of an effective and suitable 
outcome will reinforce that trust attitude.  On the other hand, ineffectiveness may cause the 
operator to reassess the level of trust in the automation. 
3.2 Development of the SE Model of Trust  
While the macro view is useful for understanding the relationships between expectation, 
trust, reliance, and outcome, it has insufficient detail to be used when building systems 
architectures.  To provide the requisite detail to allow systems and software engineers to consider 
trust explicitly within system architectures, the authors constructed a model using Unified 
Modeling Language (UML) notation.  This structure is appropriate for Systems Modeling 
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Language (SysML) architectures also.  The model will be described throughout the remainder of 
this chapter. 
The UML model enabled the depiction of trust-related elements as object classes with 
associated attributes and methods.  Attributes, depicted under the class name, are variables for 
each object of that class possesses.  Methods, depicted in the bottom partition of each class, can 
be considered as functions performed by an object of that class.  By depicting elements of the 
trust relationship as UML classes, these human cognitive activities may be represented as “trust 
objects” in architecture products.  The UML classes may eventually provide linkages between 
trust objects and hardware or software objects representing components of system automation. 
3.2.1 Perception 
Chapter 2 developed a framework of trust and its dependencies.  One of the major 
premises was that beliefs and perceptions are part of the information base that determines the 
trust attitude and affects operator reliance (Lee & See, 2004).  The major concepts discussed in 
the literature were: situational awareness, self-confidence, time stress, and mental workload.  For 
purposes of the current research, these concepts were classified as operator perceptions.  Figure 9 
was constructed to portray this relationship. 
Operator Perception
+Perceive()
+Comprehend()
+Project()
Situational Awareness
-Degree
Self-Confidence
-Cost of delay
Time Stress
-Resources
Mental Workload
 
Figure 9 - UML Class Hierarchy of Operator Perception 
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Each of these perception constructs can be assessed empirically by designers to create 
automation that complements operator capabilities.  However, an operator will behave based on 
their own mental model of each construct rather than objective measures of their own ability.  By 
applying the model presented throughout this chapter to architecture, the authors believe 
designers will be able to shape operator perception to be more realistic to the automation’s actual 
capabilities, as well as the operator’s own abilities. 
3.2.2 Context 
Lee and See (2004) developed a model depicting the interaction of varying contexts as 
they relate to the evolution of trust: social, organizational, and individual.  Bhattacharya,  
et al. (1998) also describes the environment and its inherent uncertainty as a context for the trust 
relationship.  Those studies provided a basis for the UML diagram in Figure 10. 
Context
-Reputation
-Roles
Organizational
Situational
-Norms
-Shared Experiences
Social
-Training
-Experience
-General Inclination
Individual
-Uncertainty
-Risk
Environment
+Adaptive Automation()
-Transparency
-Predictability
System State
 
Figure 10 - UML Class Hierarchy of Context 
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In the class Individual, the following attributes were added: Training, Experience, and 
General Inclination.  General inclination was defined as the inherent propensity to trust that 
varies across individuals.  Therefore, this notion is an attribute specific to the subclass 
Individual.  Likewise, training and experience with the system and automation are individual-
specific properties, and therefore attributes of this subclass. 
This research effort classified Environment and System State as subclasses of Situational 
Context.  As outlined in Chapter 2, uncertainty is one of the main drivers for the need for trust 
where situational context plays a major role.  Environments (considering both operational and 
local) constantly change during missions and the uncertainty and riskiness of the environment at 
any given point in time will ultimately impact an operator’s trust in the automation.  
 Likewise, the current state of the system is situation dependent and must be consistent 
with the current needs of the operator.  Otherwise, the system will not perform as expected, thus 
affecting the trust relationship.  Transparency is defined as the amount of knowledge an operator 
has about why the automation performs as it does.  The relationship between transparency and 
trust is not linear and therefore system planners must implement appropriate training to provide 
operators a degree of transparency, which can improve the accuracy of their expectations of 
system performance.  However, appropriate transparency can also be designed into the system 
itself.  For example, Chapter 2 describes how adaptive automation adjusts to the needs of the 
operator in a given situation, enhancing mission effectiveness by making the best use of 
human/machine collaboration. 
3.2.3 Interaction of perception and context 
This research differentiated the concepts of context and operator perception based upon 
their objective/subjective nature.  Context refers to the objective components of the system and 
its environment while operator perception encompasses the subjective measures.  Operator 
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perception and context are interconnected through the expectations that an operator forms based 
upon the system context and the perceptions they develop in relation to the context and system 
automation.  Figure 11 was developed to demonstrate this relationship. 
Operator Perception
+Perceive()
+Comprehend()
+Project()
Situational Awareness
-Degree
Self-Confidence
-Cost of delay
Time Stress
-Resources
Mental Workload
Context
-Reputation
-Roles
Organizational
Situational
-Norms
-Shared Experiences
Social
-Training
-Experience
-General Inclination
Individual
-Uncertainty
-Risk
Environment
+Adaptive Automation()
-Transparency
-Predictability
System State
-Strength
-Importance
Expectation
* *
 
Figure 11 - Interaction of Perception, Context, and Trust 
The various contexts and operator perceptions coalesce to develop a set of expectations 
that influence the trust relationship.  For example, different contexts and levels of self-
confidence will develop operator expectations on whether or not they feel they can operate better 
with or without system automation.  In addition, situational context and operator perceptions will 
form a set of expectations on the level of operator input and control that is needed.  For example, 
an operator flying a time-sensitive-target mission must deal with a rapidly changing environment 
in which his expectations may be biased toward anticipating events and acting decisively.  This 
will likely cause him to operate the system differently than if he was conducting routine 
surveillance of stationary targets, in which the operator may expect the situation to be relatively 
stable, and any change that occurs need only be noted and not immediately acted upon.  This 
example portrays the attribute of importance in the expectations that are developed, as where the 
prior example highlights the utility of the strength attribute of expectations.  It also demonstrates 
the interplay of context and perception, in this case situational context and time stress. 
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3.2.4 Trust 
Operator perceptions and context interact to form expectations.  Expectations, in turn, 
form the primary inputs to trust.  The UML diagram in Figure 12 demonstrates these 
interactions. 
 
Figure 12 - Interaction of trust, perception, context and expectations 
 These relationships are consistent with Bhattacharya, et al.’s (1998) research, which 
determined that trust is formed in part by expectations, as well as Lee and See’s work that 
portrayed context and perceptions as elements to evolution of trust.    In addition, Lee and See 
characterized trust as an attitude to differentiate trust from the inputs of belief and information 
that form trust (Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, 1998); (Lee & See, 2004). 
Muir’s trust bases, Technical Competence, Persistence, and Fiduciary Responsibility, 
provided the foundation of attributes for the class as they are the inherent characteristics that 
define the multidimensional nature of trust.  In addition, Lee and See’s (2004) dynamics of trust, 
Predictability, Dependability, and Faith (identified here as Believe), act as the three fundamental 
methods, or stages, that an operator can have in his/her trust relationship (Muir, 1994). 
 
Operator Perception
+Perceive()
+Comprehend()
+Project()
Situational Awareness
Self-Confidence
-Degree
Time Stress
-Cost of delay
Mental Workload
-Resources
Context
Organizational
-Reputation
-Roles
Situational
Social
-Norms
-Shared Experiences
Individual
-Training
-Experience
-General Inclination
Environment
-Uncertainty
-Risk
+Adaptive Automation()
System State
-Transparency
-Predictability
+Predict()
+Depend()
+Believe()
Trust
-Technical Competence
-Persistence
-Fiduciary Responsibility
Expectation
-Strength
-Importance
* *
/ Affects
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3.2.5 Reliance Decision and its Outcome 
 An operator’s trust in a system will be one of the main inputs into the decision of whether 
or not to rely on the system.  The literature review in Chapter 2 defined three factors that result 
from the trust-reliance relationship.  These were added as the main attributes of reliance: 
Calibration, Resolution, and Specificity.  As described in Chapter 2, the goal for system planners 
is to design a system that fosters good calibration, high resolution, and high specificity.  Varying 
levels of these attributes will lead an operator either to Use, Misuse, or Disuse the system.  These 
are the three methods of reliance, where Use implies appropriate reliance, Misuse implies 
overreliance, and Disuse implies underreliance. These factors thus represent the outcomes of the 
reliance decision, as depicted in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13 - Reliance Decision Tree 
In Figure 13, D represents the reliance decision (i.e. accept or reject automation).  Circles 
labeled E represent the operator’s expectation of the automation’s capability.  As previously 
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discussed, expectation has some degree of strength, shown as a probability p.  Circles labeled A 
represent the actual capability of the automation, with some probability q that it is actually 
correct.  In this model, it could be argued that the difference between expected capability p and 
actual capability q relates to the calibration of trust.  Given the expected and actual capability, 
the possible outcomes of the reliance decision are represented as triangles.  In forming 
expectations about possible outcomes, the operator will have mentally assigned each foreseeable 
outcome a value, although that value is often subjective.  Shown here as U(Oi) (where i 
represents the set of all foreseeable outcomes,) this value represents the utility, or importance, to 
the operator of achieving outcome Oi. 
The utility of the actual outcome achieved, compared to the utility of the expected 
outcome, will shape the operator’s future expectations and will ultimately affect the trust 
attitude.  In other words, the degree to which the actual outcome matches the operator's 
expectation will affect the individual, situational, and/or organizational context for future 
iterations of this model.  This change of context will reinforce or alter expectations and trust. 
3.2.6 Integrated Model of Trust 
 In summary, this research effort combined all of the above concepts related to trust and 
reliance to develop the integrated model shown in Figure 14. 
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Operator Perception
+Perceive()
+Comprehend()
+Project()
Situational Awareness
-Degree
Self-Confidence
-Cost of delay
Time Stress
-Resources
Mental Workload
Context
-Reputation
-Roles
Organizational
Situational
-Norms
-Shared Experiences
Social
-Training
-Experience
-General Inclination
Individual
-Uncertainty
-Risk
Environment
+Adaptive Automation()
-Transparency
-Predictability
System State+Predict()
+Depend()
+Believe()
-Technical Competence
-Persistence
-Fiduciary Responsibility
Trust
+Misuse()
+Disuse()
+Use()
-Calibration
-Resolution
-Specificity
Reliance
-Effectiveness
-Suitability
Outcome
/ Influences
-Strength
-Importance
Expectation
* *
/ Affects
/ Affects
/ Influences
/ Affects
 
Figure 14 - SE Model of Trust Relationships 
 The main intent of this research is to provide a means of architecting trust early in 
system design in order to develop systems that will increase mission effectiveness.  Therefore, 
effectiveness and suitability are the main attributes of the class Outcome.  These measures 
develop the foundation for a user to evaluate the appropriateness of their trust in the system.  As 
a whole, this model serves as a guide to explicitly address trust within system architectures.  
Architectures can be developed in many ways, but those of relevance to military planners 
generally follow the DoD Architecture Framework, or DoDAF. 
3.3 DoD Architecture Framework 
3.3.1 Application of Trust Model to System Architecture 
 The trust model described in this chapter is derived from a large body of work by 
researchers in human factors, psychology, human systems integration, and other related 
disciplines.  The model is intended to aid systems engineers to improve the effectiveness of 
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system design by considering trust relationships and their related tasks, information 
requirements, and processes explicitly during architecture development.  Therefore, the model is 
in line with the HSI community’s emphasis to integrate human capabilities into system design 
beginning with conceptualization and continuing through system disposal.  In order to do so, the 
trust model must be applicable to existing architecture frameworks, both at the conceptual level 
and as elements of specific products.  This integration will be discussed in the next chapter. 
3.3.2 DoDAF v1.5 
 The DoD Architecture Framework “provides the guidance and rules for developing, 
representing, and understanding architectures based on a common denominator across DoD, 
Joint, and multinational boundaries.”  DoDAF version 1.5 consists of four types of views: 
Operational View (OV), Systems and Services View (SV), Technical Standards View (TV), and 
All View.  Applied correctly, these views form an integrated architecture, which means that the 
different views are not independent representations of separate parts of the system.  Rather, 
“architecture data elements are uniquely identified and consistently used across all products and 
views within the architecture” (DoDAF Version 1.5, 2007).  The individual views, then, are 
different ways to represent aspects of the system in order for members of interdisciplinary 
subsystem engineering teams to integrate their components with the overall effort. 
The OV mainly represents the different tasks and activities that the system performs 
along with operational nodes and the associated information exchanges.   In accomplishing this 
representation, the views are designed to convey the types of information exchanged, the 
frequency of exchange, the tasks and activities supported by the information exchange, and the 
nature of the information exchanges.  The SV is designed to portray the system, service, and 
interconnection functionality providing for, or supporting operational activities.  Therefore, 
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many aspects of the systems views are linked back to artifacts with the operational views.  The 
TVs are comprised of a set of rules that provide the necessary framework to establish 
engineering guidelines and product lines to ensure the system is built to satisfy the specified set 
of operational requirements.  The AV is designed to establish the scope and context of the 
architecture.  The AV is comprised of the overarching aspects that relate to all three views 
including products such as vision statements, CONOPS, scenarios, etc. (DoDAF Version 1.5, 
2007).  The major relationships among the types of views are illustrated in Figure 15 below. 
 
Figure 15 - Fundamental Linkages Among the Views, DoDAF v1.5 Vol. 2 
 In all, there are 28 distinct views that define the system, its components, and their 
interactions.  The applicable views, their product name, and a brief description of each are 
outlined in Table 1. 
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Table 1 - List of Views in DoDAF v1.5 
Applicable 
View 
Frame-
work 
Product 
Framework Product 
Name General Description 
All View 
AV-1 
Overview and 
Summary Information 
Scope, purpose, intended users, environment depicted, 
analytical findings 
All View 
AV-2 
Integrated Dictionary Architecture data repository with definitions of all terms 
used in products 
Operational 
OV-1 
High-Level 
Operational Concept 
Graphic 
High-level graphical/textual description of operational 
concept 
Operational 
OV-2 
Operational Node 
Connectivity 
Operational nodes, connectivity, and information 
exchange need lines between nodes 
Operational 
OV-3 
Operational 
Information Exchange 
Matrix 
Information exchanged between nodes and the relevant 
attributes of that exchange 
Operational 
OV-4 
Organizational 
Relationships Chart 
Organizational, role, or other relationships among 
organizations 
Operational 
OV-5 
Operational Activity 
Model 
Capabilities, operational activities, relationships among 
activities, inputs, and outputs; overlays can show cost, 
performing nodes, or other pertinent information 
Operational 
OV-6a 
Operational Rules 
Model 
One of three products used to describe operational 
activity—identifies business rules that constrain 
operation 
Operational 
OV-6b 
Operational State 
Transition Description 
One of three products used to describe operational 
activity—identifies business process responses to 
events 
Operational 
OV-6c 
Operational Event-
Trace Description 
One of three products used to describe operational 
activity—traces actions in a scenario or sequence of 
events 
Operational 
OV-7 
Logical Data Model Documentation of the system data requirements and 
structural business process rules of the Operational 
View 
Systems and 
Services SV-1 
Systems and Services 
Interface Description 
Identification of systems nodes, systems, system items, 
services, and service items and their interconnections, 
within and between nodes 
Systems and 
Services SV-2 
Systems and Services 
Communications 
Description 
Systems nodes, systems, system items, services, and 
service items and their related communications 
laydowns 
Systems and 
Services 
SV-3 
Systems-Systems/ 
Services-Systems/ 
Services-Services 
Matrix 
Relationships among systems and services in a given 
architecture; can be designed to show relationships of 
interest, e.g., system-type interfaces, planned vs. 
existing interfaces, etc. 
Systems and 
Services SV-4a 
Systems Functionality 
Description 
Functions performed by systems and the system data 
flows among system functions 
Systems and 
Services SV-4b 
Services Functionality 
Description 
Functions performed by services and the service data 
flow among service functions 
Systems and 
Services SV-5a 
Operational Activity to 
Systems Function 
Traceability Matrix 
Mapping of system functions back to operational 
activities 
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Applicable 
View 
Frame-
work 
Product 
Framework Product 
Name General Description 
Systems and 
Services SV-5b 
Operational Activity to 
Systems Traceability 
Matrix 
Mapping of systems back to capabilities or operational 
activities 
Systems and 
Services SV-5c 
Operational Activity to 
Services Traceability 
Matrix 
Mapping of services back to operational activities 
Systems and 
Services SV-6 
Systems and Services 
Data Exchange Matrix 
Provides details of system or service data elements 
being exchanged between systems or services and the 
attributes of that exchange 
Systems and 
Services SV-7 
Systems and Services 
Performance 
Parameters Matrix 
Performance characteristics of Systems and Services 
View elements for the appropriate time frame(s) 
Systems and 
Services SV-8 
Systems and Services 
Evolution Description 
Planned incremental steps toward migrating a suite of 
systems or services to a more efficient suite, or toward 
evolving a current system to a future implementation 
Systems and 
Services SV-9 
Systems and Services 
Technology Forecast 
Emerging technologies and software/hardware products 
that are expected to be available in a given set of time 
frames and that will affect future development of the 
architecture 
Systems and 
Services 
SV-10a 
Systems and Services 
Rules Model 
One of three products used to describe system and 
service functionality—identifies constraints that are 
imposed on systems/services functionality due to some 
aspect of systems design or implementation 
Systems and 
Services SV-10b 
Systems and Services 
State Transition 
Description 
One of three products used to describe system and 
service functionality—identifies responses of a 
system/service to events 
Systems and 
Services 
SV-10c 
Systems and Services 
Event-Trace 
Description 
One of three products used to describe system or 
service functionality—identifies system/service-specific 
refinements of critical sequences of events described in 
the Operational View 
Technical 
Standards TV-1 
Technical Standards 
Profile 
Listing of standards that apply to Systems and Services 
View elements in a given architecture 
Technical 
Standards TV-2 
Technical Standards 
Forecast 
Description of emerging standards and potential impact 
on current Systems and Services View elements, within 
a set of time frames 
 
3.3.3 DoDAF v2.0 
The draft DoDAF version 2.0 (DoDAF Version 2.0, 2008) adds additional types of 
views, but emphasizes the architecture process rather than the generation of specific products.  
V2.0 describes its focus as follows: "The central core of DoDAF v2.0 is a data-centric approach 
where the creation of architectures to support decision-making is secondary to the collection, 
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storage, and maintenance of data needed for efficient and effective decisions. The architect and 
stakeholders select views to ensure that architectures will explain current and future states of the 
process or activity under review" (DoDAF Version 2.0, 2008).  Accordingly, further discussion 
of system architecture in this research will concentrate on process rather than specific products, 
although products may be used to illustrate important points.  For reference, Figure 16 
demonstrates the evolution of DoDAF views in version 2.0 and provides a mapping of DoDAF 
v1.5 views to the new framework. 
 
Figure 16 - Notional Mapping of DoDAF v1.5 Views to Draft DoDAF 2.0 Views 
 49 
 
3.4 Zall/O’Malley Model 
3.4.1 Architecting Cognition 
 Research conducted by Zall and O’Malley (2008) focused on integrating human 
cognition into DoD systems architecture.  They identified five pertinent areas of cognition that 
provided the foundation for early system trades, and manpower, personnel, and training (MPT) 
decisions.  These five areas are: Cognitive Tasks, Cognitive Inputs, Cognitive Outputs, Cognitive 
Roles, and Cognitive Environments (Zall & O'Malley, 2008). 
 One of the main drivers behind Zall and O’Malley’s research was the development of 
cognitive tasks (an identification of which type of cognition is required) and allocation of the 
task to either human or machine; i.e. either cognitive or pseudo-cognitive (CPC) tasks.  These 
allocations in early architecture provide the framework for system developers and planners to 
better understand and incorporate varying levels of automation and human supervisory control 
into systems. 
 Cognitive inputs are the specific information that the cognitive tasks require to be 
completed while the cognitive output is the consequential set of information that results from the 
cognitive task (Zall & O'Malley, 2008).  These two types of information can depict the necessary 
enabling items and system complexity when outlined in the system’s architecture to aid the 
developer/planner in identifying and avoiding potential HSI shortfalls.  
 The cognitive role evolves from a specified set of cognitive tasks and is intended to take 
on a specific personnel position description to help define MPT system requirements (Zall & 
O'Malley, 2008).  The premise of architecting this aspect is to ensure that personnel are utilized 
to their maximum potential and are not under/over utilized by allocating too few/many cognitive 
tasks to the specific cognitive role an operator will fill. 
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 Lastly, architecting the cognitive environment provides a necessary representation of the 
interactions different roles and entities will have on one another.  In addition, the cognitive 
environment presents an opportunity to account for any design related constraints that MPT 
requirements may place on the system such as whether or not an operator has enough space to 
properly work. 
3.4.2 Fundamental CPC Tasks 
 Zall and O’Malley used an atomic approach to decompose the many cognitive task types 
into a smaller set of fundamental tasks or “bases” that can be combined to form any type of 
cognitive activity.  These bases are outlined in Table 2. 
Table 2 - Early Conceptual Design Eight Fundamental CPC Tasks (Zall & O'Malley, 2008) 
 
 
 The focus of their research was to integrate these elements of cognition into existing 
DoDAF products.  Because the cognitive tasks primarily represent activities, Zall and O’Malley 
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(2008) focused their efforts on expanding OV-5 activity diagrams to include all activities down 
to the cognitive level.  This process was developed to help identify the cognitive tasks in a 
system and assist engineers in allocating these tasks to either human or machine. 
3.5 Architecting for Appropriate Trust 
 As previously described, the trust relationship includes activities and data elements.  
Thus, while the techniques developed by Zall & O'Malley (2008) provide a starting point from 
which to architect trust, they are insufficient to encapsulate the full trust relationship due to their 
focus on activities.  Therefore, in addition to developing objects within the architecture views, 
the various trust dependencies will be evaluated as data elements and information exchanges 
identified during the architecture process. 
 To determine methods for architecting trust, it is necessary to evaluate a host of views 
from a particular framework.  In accomplishing this task, DoDAF version 1.5 architecture 
products will be used; however, it is necessary to reiterate that the application of a process, not 
the generation of products, is the enduring goal of this research.  The primary focus will be to 
develop a strategy to aid systems engineers and planners in considering the trust relationship in 
system design.  This emphasis on process, rather than products, will be consistent with DoDAF 
version 2.0. 
 The final portion of our research will evaluate the architecture products associated with a 
particular developmental UAS.  The goal of this evaluation is to demonstrate a strategy that can 
be applied to any type of system within any architecture framework which will provide 
maximum applicability for systems engineers. 
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Chapter 4: Process for Integrating Trust Within DoDAF 
4.1 The DoDAF Architecture Process 
 The integration of trust into system architecture should not be an afterthought or 
corrective action, but rather should occur throughout the architecture development process.  
Accordingly, the basic processes for integrating trust will coincide with those of the larger 
architecture effort.  DoDAF v2.0 describes a six-step architecture development process, as 
follows (DoDAF Version 2.0, 2008). 
 Step 1: Determine Intended Use of Architecture.  In this step, the architect defines the 
purpose and intended use of the architecture, and establishes the architecture strategy for the 
project.  This is generally based on information provided by the process owner.  
 Step 2: Determine Scope of Architecture.  Scope refers to the depth and breadth of the 
architecture.  In this step, the architecture's problem set and context are defined, and the architect 
begins to define the level of detail required for the architecture content.  It is important for the 
architect to define a clear and appropriate scope that enables an expected result but avoids 
excessive breadth.  For example, often only the manmade system components are addressed. 
 Step 3: Determine Data Required to Support Architecture Development. The scope 
defined in step 2 influences the level of detail needed for each data entity and attribute.  Here, 
data refers to both the information needed for execution of the process, and other data needed to 
produce the desired process changes (e.g. documentation about the architecture effort itself.) The 
data content is recorded as attributes, associations, and concepts that will later be mapped to 
specific architecture views as needed.  
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 Step 4: Collect, Organize, Correlate, and Store Architecture Data.  In this step, 
architects collect and organize data in order to develop a structure for the overall architecture 
effort.  The data are organized into a taxonomy that allows identification of data gaps, as well as 
process and services required.  
 Step 5: Conduct analyses in support of architecture objectives.  This step prepares the 
architecture for approval by the process owner by validating the architecture effort against 
established process owner requirements. If changes are required from the validation process, they 
are made by iterating steps 3 through 5 as necessary.  
 Step 6: Document Results in Accordance with Architecture Framework.  The final 
step involves the creation of actual architecture views as needed, based on the underlying data 
developed in the previous steps.  DoDAF v2.0 provides a number of predefined “DoDAF-
described Views”, including many of those contained in DoDAF v1.5 and similar frameworks.  
The DoDAF does not require specific views to be used, but encourages architects to use DoDAF-
defined views where applicable.  However, DoDAF v2.0 also provides user-defined views, or 
'Fit-for-purpose Views', which can be created in non-standard formats as long as they are 
consistent with the DoDAF meta-model.  This allows architects to tailor products to their 
specific project or organization, or to support their key decision-maker.   
4.2 Architecture Methodologies 
 The execution of the six-step architecture development process requires the use of 
analytical techniques to organize and portray system elements.  These generally fall into two 
classes of approaches: Structured Analysis and Object-Oriented Analysis. 
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 Structured Analysis is a process-oriented approach that centers on hierarchical 
decomposition of processes, along with corresponding inputs, outputs, controls, and mechanisms 
(ICOMs).  Structured Analyses may result in process data flow diagrams, which allow users to 
visualize how specific data inputs trace to given actions; process task-dependency diagrams, 
which depict the flow of material, information, or a service through all its steps in a logical or 
required order; and entity-relation models, which describe the structure of system domain data 
types and the rules that govern system data (DoDAF Version 2.0, 2008). 
 Object-Oriented Analysis (OOA), describes the operational use cases, places data in the 
context in which it will be used, and provides traceability for system and software design.  OOA 
consists of activity diagrams, which depict dynamic system behavior; class and object diagrams, 
which portray sets of objects (i.e. performers) and their relationships as classes (object types).  
Another useful diagram in Object Oriented Analyses is the sequence diagram, showing the 
temporal changing nature of interacting objects (DoDAF Version 2.0, 2008). 
 These approaches are not mutually exclusive, and integrated architectures often will 
make use of both techniques, manifested in different views to demonstrate various aspects of the 
system.  The trust model developed in Chapter 3 is applicable within both techniques, depending 
on the purposes for which it is needed in specific parts of the architecture process. 
4.3 Architecting Trust 
 The emphasis on process, rather than products, in DoDAF v2.0 provides a standard 
framework within which to develop system architectures, while allowing system architects 
flexibility in creating the architecture itself.  When considering trust within the framework, the 
six steps of the DoDAF process can be paired into three stages: Determine Scope and View; 
Determine and Organize the Data; and Analyze and Document Results.  Portions of the trust 
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model developed in chapter 3 can be applied during each of these stages, as will be described 
throughout the remainder of this section.  In addition, the authors have prepared a summary of 
this section as a quick reference guide for system architects and technical managers.  This 
summary can be found as Appendix A. 
4.3.1 Determine Scope and View 
The Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2007) process provides system planners with a high level view of the requirements needed to 
fulfill an existing gap in the Department of Defense.  As a new system enters into the formal 
acquisition process, systems engineers and planners have a basic understanding of the 
requirements that are needed to fulfill the gap; however, few system-specific details exist at this 
stage in the process.  This overarching JCIDS view of the required capability provides systems 
engineers and planners a basis to begin to consider the relationships that arise in system design 
and then begin to plan for incorporating trust into the human-system relationships. 
Within the current architecture framework, the main views present at this stage would be 
the AV-1 Overview and Summary Information, and the OV-1 High-Level Operational Concept 
Graphic.  These views provide planners with graphical and textual representations of how the 
system will be implemented.  The architect can begin to incorporate trust using these views by 
determining how and where an operator may interact with the system.  These interactions form 
the foundation of the trust relationship.  By identifying the foundation of the trust relationship, 
the architect should be able to focus subsequent development efforts where they will most 
improve trust.  In addition, the AV-1 provides insight into the nature of the expected operational 
environment of the system.  The operational conditions are important in establishing the 
situational context portion of the trust model.  Likewise, the uncertainty and risk inherent in the 
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operational environment are key factors in establishing operator expectations, which will drive 
the trust relationship between the operator and the automation. 
Also within this stage, planners should consider the manpower, personnel, and training 
(MPT) requirements needed to operate the system.  By shaping MPT requirements early in the 
development process, planners can account for the influence of organizational context (e.g. 
command structure, roles) and individual context (e.g. training, familiarity with a given interface) 
of their intended user, rather than reacting to the influences post hoc. 
Knowledge of context may affect design decisions, or a specific design implementation 
may inspire changes to training.  In either case, early architecture steps are useful to begin to 
determine scenarios where operator trust in automation will be particularly important and to 
define corresponding design requirements to foster appropriate trust within those operating 
scenarios. 
4.3.2 Determine and Organize the Data 
 System architects focus much effort on determining and collecting data elements 
necessary to define roles and activities within the system.  Determining and collecting data 
elements allows planners to apply the trust lens, by determining which trust bases and 
dependencies are relevant within the system, under what scenarios they are critical, and how to 
effectively integrate and portray the elements.   
 During the determination and collection of data steps, architects should focus on 
providing transparency of the system’s state to the operator in a manner that allows operators to 
form accurate expectations, and then reinforce appropriate trust.  This might be accomplished by 
displaying confidence information about automated functions (Antifakos, Kern, Schiele, & 
Schwaninger, 2005); (Jamieson, Wang, & Neyedli, 2008) by adapting the behavior of 
automation in order to account for operator perceptions, like SA or mental workload (Cummings 
 57 
 
& Mitchell, 2008); (Parasuraman, Barnes, & Cosenzo, 2007), or other implementation-specific 
means.  As the system architecture is developed and refined, architects can account for trust 
while establishing specific operating scenarios and making design decisions. 
There are four main categories of architecture views that systems engineers and architects 
will be concerned with: functional/behavioral, informational, sequence/temporal, and structural.  
Each of these categories allows system architects to portray different aspects of the trust 
relationships within their system. 
4.3.2.1 Functional / Behavioral 
 Functionally decomposing a system will allow planners and designers to obtain a more 
in-depth understanding of the tasks the system will perform and the human and machine system 
nodes that are essential in accomplishing them.  Information exchanges between system nodes 
directly impact certain trust dependencies and therefore must be accounted for during system 
design.  For example, knowledge of the system state (e.g. system transparency) will facilitate 
more appropriate operator-automation trust if the underlying data is displayed effectively 
(Konstantinou, Liagkou, Spirakis, Stamatiou, & Yung, 2005). 
In addition, an understanding of the inputs, controls, outputs, and mechanisms (ICOMs) 
that drive system activities will be pertinent in the creation and/or modification of data elements 
that will aid designers in architecting for appropriate trust.  For example, one of the 
recommendations from earlier research detailed in Chapter 2 was to display system confidence to 
the operator (Antifakos, Kern, Schiele, & Schwaninger, 2005).  This activity may require the 
addition of a new task with new information exchanges between system components. 
Two of the main views in DoDAF v1.5 that focus on functional elements are the OV-5 
Operational Activity Model, and the SV-4 Systems Functionality Description.  The OV-5 
portrays activities and the ICOMs that relate to them.  As mentioned in Chapter 3, Zall and 
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O’Malley (2008) outlined a process to incorporate fundamental cognitive tasks in OV-5 
diagrams.  Their main focus was to enhance the views in relation to the MPT requirements by 
adding ICOMs and tasks, and classifying them as cognitive (human) or pseudo-cognitive 
(machine).  The differentiation of cognitive and pseudo-cognitive tasks with ICOMs implies 
interaction between human operators and automation, and thus the presence of trust relationships 
that need to be considered during architecture development.  In addition, as Zall and O'Malley 
discussed, the allocation of cognitive and pseudo-cognitive tasks provides a basis to develop 
tailored training that enhances relationships between actors in the system.  This training could 
develop and/or reinforce the individual context component of the trust model, and could provide 
input to allow the operator to form expectations of the system's behavior under realistic 
operational conditions. 
4.3.2.2 Informational 
 Portrayals of system information exchanges are increasingly important in the 
architectures of complex systems.  Since trust is inherently dependent on the information the 
trustor has about the trustee, the environment, etc., the depiction of informational flows in the 
system will be particularly relevant to trust.  Consideration of elements such as situational 
context may necessitate additional information flows, due to their effect on forming and 
reinforcing operator expectations, trust, and reliance. 
 Informational elements typically are depicted in views such as the SV-6 Data Exchange 
Matrix, which "specifies the characteristics of the system data exchanged between systems. This 
product focuses on automated information exchanges that are implemented in systems" (DoDAF 
Version 1.5, 2007).  Likewise, the OV-7 Logical Data Model "describes the structure of an 
architecture domain’s system data types and the structural business process rules that govern the 
system data" (DoDAF Version 1.5, 2007). 
 59 
 
4.3.2.3 Sequence / Temporal 
 The development of time-phased portrayals of the system activities provides the 
foundation for engineers to determine the desired dynamics and level of trust for anticipated 
situations.  In essence, sequence diagrams will foster the development of the type and level of 
automation that is most effective for the different scenarios and environments that the system 
will be expected to operate in.  As anticipated events and desired outcomes are outlined in given 
scenarios, the criticality and time stress of each can be assessed in order to design proper 
automation. 
 The information derived from sequence diagrams will provide the basis for designers to 
evaluate where and when to use adaptive automation as outlined in Chapter 2.  This type of 
automation will be imperative in some highly critical and time stressed situations where operator 
faith in the automation is necessary to accomplish the objectives.  In addition, planners can 
utilize this information to build their training scenarios in order to provide realistic operator 
experience, which will improve the operator’s ability to predict system behavior and reinforce 
realistic expectations about the system’s dependability. 
 The main DoDAF views that depict sequence information are the OV-6c Operational 
Event-Trace Description, and the SV-10c Systems Event-Trace Description.  The OV-6c is a 
time-phased portrayal of the operational activities to accomplish a mission, while the SV-10c 
captures the changing system state over time including the data exchanges that occur between 
system components.  Additional data exchanges such as the receipt and acknowledgement of a 
command directly following an operator command will likely result in an enhancement in the 
relationship between the operator and automation.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, the workload of 
current Global Hawk operators is unnecessarily increased due to the need to check system 
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responses to ensure the automation received the command.  Additional information exchanges 
would alleviate this problem and help foster the transition to one operator multiple UAS systems. 
4.3.2.4 Structural 
An understanding of all the subsystems that comprise the overall system and their 
interfaces will provide the information necessary to visualize the interconnections and their 
relationships.  One of the main goals of the Human Factors Engineering domain within the HSI 
community is to create effective integration of human-system interfaces to achieve optimal total 
system performance (INCOSE, August 2007).  These elements portray automation, the human, 
and what relationships exist between them.  With respect to trust, knowledge of system 
interdependence is paramount in determining whether or not additional interfaces are needed to 
facilitate the trust relationship.  For example, to provide verification of commands and display 
system confidence, the systems that provide information must interface with each other.  In 
addition, as illustrated in the trust model developed in chapter 3, the operator's knowledge of the 
system state, combined with perceptions such as SA, affect trust by influencing expectations 
about the system's predictability and dependability. 
 The architecture views that contain structural type of information are the SV-1 Systems 
Interface Description and the SV-3 Systems-Systems, Services-Systems, Services-Services 
Matrices.  The SV-1 provides a view of all the systems and services and their interconnections, 
while the SV-3 details the relationships and interfaces between the systems and services.  Any 
tasks, activities or system functions that were added to the OV-5, SV-4, OV-6c, SV-10c, etc. to 
reflect trust relationships must be accounted for in the SV-1 and SV-3. 
4.3.3 Analyze and Document Results 
 The last two steps in the architecture development process seek to validate the output of 
the previous steps and to create architecture products based on the validated data.  It is important 
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to note that the data requirements definition, data gathering, analysis (validation), and 
documentation (product generation) steps are iterative processes.  As the system architecture 
matures, relationships between system nodes may change, which may require reassessment of 
the activities and information exchanges required to support appropriate operator-automation 
trust. 
4.4 Practical Application of the Trust Lens 
 A conceptual look at a trust-integrated architecture development process illustrates that it 
is possible to address trust explicitly within system architectures.  By doing so, engineers may 
affect changes to system design to reinforce innate trust relationships, and theoretically, raise 
overall system effectiveness by shaping the operator's trust in automation in ways that improve 
the speed and accuracy of man/machine collaboration.  Moreover, this can be done regardless of 
the actual architecture framework employed or specific products used to define it. 
 However, a theoretical examination of the architecture development process cannot 
demonstrate these conclusions definitively.  To do so, it is necessary to examine the architecture 
of a real world system, apply the trust integration process described, and assess the results for 
indicators of improved system effectiveness.  This research will now apply the theoretical study 
to the Battlefield Airman Tactical Camera (BATCAM) UAS. 
4.4.1 Intro to BATCAM/CUSS Architecture 
 The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) is currently conducting research in 
multiple UAS areas.  Several current masters’ students at AFIT are conducting research in CUSS 
to optimize control of multiple UAVs for varying tasks including, but not limited to: formation 
manipulation, optimization of coverage area, flight path deconfliction, and sensor placement 
optimization.  The platform being used for this research is the BATCAM UAS.  This ongoing 
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research provides opportunity for the current authors to apply the trust relationships to an 
existing UAS infrastructure.   
4.4.1.1 System Overview 
The BATCAM UAS consists of a hand launched air vehicle that uses GPS and autopilot 
algorithms for navigation and landing, with commands (e.g. waypoints, altitude, etc.) uploaded 
from a ground control station using a PC-based interface.  Sensor data is downloaded to the same 
control station.  The air vehicle is 61cm in length, has a 53cm wingspan and weighs 
approximately 0.38kg.  Its size and weight support man portable backpack operations.  The 
BATCAM’s operations are limited due to its size, with a ceiling of 300m, a range of 3km and an 
endurance of 18 minutes.  The vehicle carries forward and side looking cameras in a removable 
pod to provide real-time situational awareness and targeting information to the operator.  The 
system was developed by the Munitions Directorate of the Air Force Research Laboratories and 
has been in inventory since 2003.  Figure 17 shows the BATCAM air vehicle. (Parsch, 2005) 
 
Figure 17 - BATCAM UAV (Parsch, 2005) 
Cummings, et al. (2007) developed a set of hierarchical control loops to describe a set of 
basic mission functions UASs must perform (see Figure 6 in this document.)  Currently, the 
BATCAM operators are involved in Mission & Payload Management, Navigation, and to some 
degree the Pilot functions.  However, due to lack of reliable automation there is high demand 
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upon the operator to maintain SA and verify that the air vehicle is performing as expected.  To 
decrease operator workload and facilitate a transition to a "one operator, multiple UAS system," 
a high degree of trust must be established between the operator and system automation.  This gap 
may present an opportunity for the current authors to apply the trust concepts outlined in the 
beginning of this chapter.    
4.4.1.2 Autopilot 
 The BATCAM UAV uses the Kestrel autopilot system, provided by Procerus 
Technologies.  Procerus offers the OnPoint software for use with the Kestrel. OnPoint is a target-
tracking program capable of providing geo-referenced track data for stationary and moving 
target. (Procerus Technologies, 2006) 
 
Figure 18 - Autopilot System (Procerus Technologies, 2006) 
4.4.1.3 Ground Station 
Two components which comprise the ground station: the Ground Control Unit (GCU) 
and the Portable Computing Device (PCD). The BATCAM uses a single GCU which integrates 
an RF modem, video receiver, and analog to digital video converter.  Analysis of the GCU 
revealed little internal coupling between these three components, with integration providing only 
a single form factor. (Sakryd & Ericson, 2008) 
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Figure 19 -  Ground Control Unit (Sakryd & Ericson, 2008) 
The PCD is the computing device which integrates most of the system’s functionality. 
The BATCAM uses a Panasonic Tough Book™ which has been ruggedized for field use. 
(Sakryd & Ericson, 2008) 
 
Figure 20 - Portable Computing Device (Sakryd & Ericson, 2008) 
 
4.4.1.4 Operations and Employment Concept 
The BATCAM UAS primary employment include the following scenarios survey a 
stationary target, survey a moving target, reconnoiter ahead of a moving vehicle, provide 
surveillance of a series of waypoints, conduct a broad area search, and conduct search for a 
target.  Each of these scenarios envisions employment of up to four UAVs operating 
cooperatively to perform the assigned mission, controlled by a single operator.  This research 
will limit its focus to the following BATCAM operations: surveying a stationary target and 
providing surveillance of a series of waypoints.  
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4.4.1.4.1 Surveil a Stationary Target BATCAM Operational Process 
A user wishes to surveil a stationary target.  The user deploys the system if it is not 
already in use.  The user inputs the location of the target into GCU.  The GCU directs one or 
more UAVs to the target location.  The UAVs transmit sensor data to the user.  Upon reaching 
the specified location, the UAVs execute a “loiter” flight pattern to provide sensor coverage on 
the target.  The user designates the target on his sensor monitoring screen.  The UAVs maintain 
sensor coverage of the target.  At the end of the mission, the UAVs return to their previous task 
or to their launching base. 
The stationary target scenario may also be entered from another surveillance task.  The 
user monitoring a UAV sensor feed identifies a fleeting target of further interest.  The user 
directs the system to monitor the target.  The UAV transitions to a “loiter” flight pattern around 
the selected target. 
The user may change the default loiter distance to try to get better sensor resolution on 
the target or to minimize the chance of detection of the UAV. 
4.4.1.4.2 Provide Surveillance of a Series of Waypoints BATCAM Operational Process 
A user wishes to provide surveillance of a series of waypoints, such as a road, route, 
perimeter, maritime transit lane, or geographic border, usually to provide sensor coverage ahead 
of a convoy.  The user deploys the system if it not already in use.  The user inputs the designated 
waypoints with the GCU. The GCU directs the UAVs to initial waypoints. The system organizes 
the coverage of the UAVs in accordance with the programmed waypoints.  The surveillance 
continues until the UAVs are recalled or redirected by the user. 
This scenario may be entered from another surveillance task.  The user detects a route 
from a UAV sensor feed.  The user uploads waypoint data with the GCU.  The user commands 
the corresponding UAV to follow the route. 
 66 
 
During the mission, if a user detects a point for further study, the user commands the 
corresponding UAV to focus on that point.  The UAV transitions to a “loiter” flight plan around 
the selected target.  The system redistributes the coverage ahead of the convoy among the 
remaining UAVs.  When the user directs the system to stop monitoring the target, the system 
directs the UAV that was designated for the selected target back into formation ahead of the 
convoy and redistributes coverage. 
4.4.2 Architecting Trust: Determining BATCAM Purpose and Scope 
 The current thesis group working with the BATCAM focused their efforts on 
categorizing and defining the system.  The following diagram is an OV-1 that was developed to 
illustrate the operational capability of the BATMCAM system.  
Forward 
Operating Base
GPS
Small Unit
Communications 
Relay
OV-1: CUSS Operational Concept
Airborne Control Unit
Ground Control 
Unit
Ground Control 
Unit
SatCom
Theater HQ
GPS Signal
CUSS Comms
C2ISR Link  
Figure 21: BATCAM Operational Concept 
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 Section 4.3.1 outlined how early system architecture products can help facilitate initial 
recognition of where and how an operator may interact with system automation as well as the 
different interfaces that potentially exist throughout the system.  From this diagram, a system 
architect can conclude that the interaction between an operator and the automation will occur at 
the Ground Control Units (GCU), and that the system will interface with the environment at the 
airframe and the GCU.  The automation will be facilitated by the CUSS software and the 
communication links between the GCUs, communications relay, and airframes.  This illustration 
also indicates additional interfaces such as: GPS – GCU, GPS – airframe, SatCom – GCU, and 
SatCom - Theater Headquarters.  The architect can use this data to direct early application of 
trust dependencies to improve system performance through appropriate trust. 
4.4.3 Trust Data Required to Support BATCAM Architecture Development 
4.4.3.1 Functional/Behavioral 
 The functional/behavioral architecture views can also foster more appropriate reliance if 
trust relationships are considered.  The AFIT BATCAM research group has developed OV-5 and 
SV-4 views that support this category.  As outlined in Section 3.5.2.2, one of the main objectives 
for the BATMCAM UAS is to provide surveillance of a series of waypoints.  Figure 22 portrays 
the main operational tasks that are required to fulfill this objective.    
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Figure 22 - Provide Surveillance OV-5 Diagram 
 This is the initial OV-5 operational diagram that was developed to describe the Provide 
Surveillance operational activity.  It is necessary to add additional ICOMs to Figure 21 in order 
to design the system for appropriate trust.  Displaying system confidence and acknowledging 
operator commands are two recommendations that were made in Section 4.3.2.1 that are 
applicable to the BATCAM UAS and expected to induce more appropriate reliance.  These two 
tasks would be represented as outputs from the Manage UAVs task.  Figure 23 shows the OV-5 
updated to reflect these two trust factors. 
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Figure 23: OV-5 Diagram with Trust Factors Added 
 In order to obtain a more in-depth understanding of where these tasks are derived from 
and how they affect system design and architecture, it is necessary to functionally decompose the 
system to the appropriate level.   As the diagram above portrays, the outputs originate from the 
task Manage UAVs.  Figure 24 portrays the functionally decomposed task before the two trust 
factors were included. 
A.1
Plan Mission
A.2
Manage UAVs
A.3
Control Sensors
A.4
Manage
Surveillance Data
Command Received
UAV Conf idence
Sensor Status
ACM Restrictions
ISR A lert
ISR Data
Mission Data
ACM Boundaries
UAV System Status
UAV Sensor Feed
Asset List
Surveillance Product
UAV Control Commands
Target Location
Mission Status
UAV Orientation
User Flight Commands
User Sensor Commands
Video Display
UAV Sensor Commands
Sensor Gimbal Angles
Sensor Tracking Error
User Retasking
Ref erence Tracking Signal
PNT Data
UAV Flight Status
Mission Status
UAV Position/Velocity
Measured Weather Data
Mission Weather Data
Mission Tasking
Mission Weather Alert
Measured Weather Alert
Mission Plan
 70 
 
 
Figure 24 - Manage UAVs OV-5 Activity Diagram 
 The two trust factors, Acknowledge Commands and Determine Confidence, were added 
as new operational tasks under the Manage UAVs functional decomposition.  The main input for 
acknowledging commands is User Flight Commands.  Therefore, this ICOM was added as an 
input to the Acknowledge Commands task.  The result of this task is the output Command 
Received.  In order to determine UAV confidence, many ICOMs are needed as inputs.  The 
authors of this research added the following ICOMs as input to the new task: UAV 
Position/Velocity, UAV System Status, Reference Tracking Signal, Formation Position Error, 
Calculate Winds, and UAV Orientation.  Figure 25 portrays the OV-5 diagram with the addition 
of the trust factors.   
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Figure 25: Updated OV-5 Diagram with Trust Factors 
 The SV-4 diagrams depict the functions that are performed by systems captured in the 
OV-5 diagrams.  For an activity to be accomplished, a system must be charged with performing 
the task or a part of the task.  Therefore, the SV-4 Systems Functionality Description diagrams 
must be updated to reflect changes in the OV-5 Operational Activity diagrams.  Figure 26 
represents the architecture before the trust factors were included. 
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Figure 26 - BATCAM SV-4 Functional Decomposition Diagram 
 The two main activities that were added need to be allocated to functions are “displaying 
system confidence” and “acknowledging operator commands”.  The CUSS software is the 
system that is best suited to compute the system confidence, and hence will be added as a 
function underneath it.  The Computing Device will display the system confidence to the user.  
This system is currently not shown and needs to be added as a sub-function under Perform 
Ground Control Functions.  It is important to take into account the system display because past 
research efforts have shown that the manner that system confidence is displayed has a direct 
impact on operator reliance upon the automation.  (Jamieson, Wang, & Neyedli, 2008)  
Determining the best method for displaying data is left as a recommendation for further study in 
Chapter 5.  Finally, acknowledging operator commands is a function that must originate from the 
aircraft control unit and therefore is added under Perform Airborne Control Unit Functions.  
Figure 27 and Figure 28 represent the BATCAM SV-4 diagrams with trust factors added. 
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Figure 27: SV-4 Diagram with Trust Factors Added 
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Figure 28: SV-4 Diagram with Trust Factors Added 
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4.4.3.2 Informational 
 The information flows between system components as well as between system 
automation and the operator are vital in designing for appropriate trust.  For example, certain 
nodes will need to provide detailed information to related nodes in order to calculate and display 
system confidence to the operator.  The OV-7 Logical Data model is a current architecture 
diagram that details the information flows that occur during operational activities.  The diagram 
below is an example OV-7 for a BATCAM CUSS related system that was developed by AFIT 
students. 
 
Figure 29: CUSS Related OV-7 Logical Data Model 
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 In order to calculate UAS system confidence, the algorithm that computes the trust factor 
needs to obtain information from the different nodes that contain the information.  For example, 
the airframe’s position and time references are vital components in ensuring that the UAS is 
flying at the coordinates the operator commanded it to.  In addition, environment factors that 
affect the performance of the aircraft, such as wind speed, provide additional information that 
may cause the aircraft to deviate from its course.  This is especially true in smaller airframes 
such as the BATCAM UAV.  The operators consistently performed visual checks on the aircraft 
during test flights when the winds were high to ensure it was flying on the preprogrammed path 
and at the correct altitude.  Figure 30 portrays the OV-7 Logical Data Model after the system 
confidence node was included along with the varying information exchanges that are required to 
display the measure to the operator. 
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4.4.3.3 Sequence/Temporal 
 The temporal architecture views provide an opportunity to examine the tasks that are 
completed during each scenario and when they are completed with relation to the other tasks.  
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Figure 30: CUSS Related OV-7 Logical Data Model with Trust Factors Included 
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This breakdown of scenarios provides engineers the information necessary to add the additional 
tasks outlined in the functional diagrams in the appropriate place to provide pertinent 
information to the operator at the right time.  In addition, the sequence diagrams provide the 
framework for deciding the type and level of automation that is most effective for each scenario.  
Figure 31 is an OV-6C Operational Event Diagram depicting the sequence of events that would 
occur during normal convoy route surveillance or surveillance of a town. 
 
 
Figure 31: OV-6c Operational Event Diagram for BATCAM Route Surveillance 
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expectations of system behavior.  Figure 32 portrays the Operational Event Diagram updated to 
reflect these acknowledgements.   
 
Figure 32: Operational Event Diagram for BATCAM Route Surveillance with Trust Factors Added 
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operator would need greater SA in order to improve his chances of locating threats in a timely 
manner.  Engineers may want to consider automation that adapts to operator needs and 
situational conditions, such as that described by Parasuraman, et al. (2007), in these scenarios to 
enhance mission effectiveness. 
4.4.3.4 Structural  
After an architect is finished applying the trust lens to ensure that appropriate trust 
dependencies have been included in system design, it is essential to examine the structural layout 
of the system in order to make certain that the interconnections and interfaces exist between the 
different subsystems to facilitate system functionality.  Figure 33 portrays the BATCAM SV-01 
Systems and Services Interfaces Description.  
 
Figure 33 - BATCAM SV-01 System Interface Diagram 
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 First, it is necessary to know where the added trust functions would exist in the structural 
view.  According to Figure 27, the task "acknowledge operator commands" would reside in the 
Airborne Control Unit, "calculate system confidence" would be in the CUSS Software, and 
"display system confidence" would be the responsibility of the Computing Device.  To 
accomplish these tasks, the systems that perform the functions must interface with each other.  
Examining Figure 33, it is apparent the Airborne System interfaces with the Ground System via 
Comm and Sensor Data Links.  Therefore, no additional interfaces need to be implemented in 
order to facilitate the acknowledgement of operator commands. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Conclusions 
 The increasing complexity of automated systems, and the need to operate them in ever 
greater numbers with fewer human operators, requires close examination of the relationship 
between human and machine.  This is especially true in the cognitive domain, which is difficult 
to quantify, model, and measure objectively.  Trust is one of the most important aspects of 
man/machine relationships due to its impact on the human operator's willingness to use the 
automated system to its full potential.  However, operators must also recognize the limitations 
inherent in the system automation and intervene when the automation’s capability has been 
exceeded.  Failure to trust appropriately often results in decreased mission effectiveness and 
sometimes in catastrophe. 
 Due to this mis-calibration of trust, systems engineers must understand how trust is 
formed, maintained, and lost, and account for man/machine trust relationships during system 
design.  This is especially important for distributed systems such as UASs, where operators are 
not physically present to observe system behavior.  The following conclusions from this effort's 
research questions represent a means to that end. 
5.1.1 Can previous research be used to create a useful trust model for systems engineering?  
 A review of trust-related literature spanning more than fifty years of research enabled the 
creation of a pedigreed trust model.  Although based on established sources by respected 
researchers, the model itself is an unprecedented attempt to enable the integration of human 
operator trust within system architectures.  This model describes the interaction of context and 
perception to form expectations, which are the primary  inputs to trust.  It portrays the attributes 
(bases) and methods (dynamics) that define trust itself, and the effect of trust on operator 
decisions (reliance).  It depicts reliance as it affects the outcome of actions taken by the operator 
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and/or system.  Lastly, it acknowledges the evolving nature of the trust attitude over time with a 
feedback loop from event outcome(s) to context.  The inclusion of social and individual context 
as inputs to trust also acknowledges its evolving nature, since context derives largely from prior 
experience.  The model is underpinned by the mapping of trust-related factors to the elements of 
a decision tree representing the reliance decision itself, including an assignment of probability 
and utility of the possible outcomes of the decision. 
 Since the model developed here is based on decades of precedent, it is not surprising to 
note that it bears similarities to segments of previous models (Muir, 1994); (Lee & See, 2004).  
Specifically, Muir's (1994) model of trust forms the basis for much of the current understanding 
of trust itself, i.e. its attributes and dynamics.  Meanwhile, Lee & See's (2004, p. 68) broader 
model portrays the influence of context on expectations (shown as belief), trust, and reliance and 
the direct impact of expectations on trust, and trust on reliance.  The model presented here, 
however, separates perception from context and depicts their association through the formation 
of expectations which influence trust.  Further, this model decomposes perception and context 
into subclasses known to affect trust.  This decomposition enables systems engineers to address 
each in the most suitable way when designing the system. 
 So, while the model proposed here is by no means the only “correct” way to portray trust, 
the model is useful to systems engineers by providing a concrete understanding of trust 
relationships in a way compatible with the development of system architecture.  Thus, the model 
allows system architects to apply a trust lens to develop automation that is more responsive to 
specific perceptual and contextual needs of the user.  The model also allows architects and other 
decision makers to address other aspects of the trust relationship through organization, training, 
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etc.  The enhanced trust relationship may improve mission effectiveness by decreasing misuse 
and disuse of automation. 
5.1.2 How can trust be considered explicitly within DoDAF? 
 In order for a trust model to be relevant to systems engineering, it must be applicable to 
the process of planning and designing systems to achieve required capabilities.  The pedigreed 
model developed in this research is intended as such a resource.  The model's representation as a 
UML class diagram enables direct linkages between portions of the trust model and components 
of system software and hardware.  These linkages allow systems engineers to reinforce realistic 
trust by shaping operator expectations.  For example, improving transparency (e.g. acknowledge 
commands) while adapting system behavior to account for operator perception (e.g. adaptive 
automation to affect situational awareness) makes systems more predictable, and thus improves 
trust. 
 More importantly, the trust lens, or understanding of trust's impact on system 
effectiveness fostered by the model, can be applied continuously during the architecture 
development process.  This focus on process over specific products is consistent with the future 
direction of the DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF Version 2.0, 2008).  Focusing on process 
also makes the model more broadly useful, since it is not specific to a particular framework or set 
of standards.  This flexibility ensures the model will remain useful as frameworks change or fit-
for-purpose views are created. 
 As with most aspects of HSI, the trust lens is most effective in improving system 
performance when it is applied from the outset.  As discussed in Chapter 4, trust relationships 
can begin to be evaluated from the moment system requirements begin to be defined.  However, 
as the BATCAM example shows, there is also value in considering trust later in the lifecycle.  In 
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short, the application of a trust lens to system architecture can enhance the relationship between 
humans and automation, and potentially improve system effectiveness. 
5.1.3 Can the utility of architecting trust be demonstrated on a given UAS architecture? 
 By applying a process-oriented approach to architecture development using a trust lens, 
may be possible to improve the trust relationship between the operator and automation, primarily 
by increasing transparency and predictability of key functions.  As mentioned, while one would 
expect the trust lens to be most effective when employed from the beginning of architecture 
development, it might also be applicable to existing systems to improve performance, as 
demonstrated with the BATCAM example.  However, further testing is required to quantify 
actual improvement to mission effectiveness. 
 The utility of the trust model, and its use to evaluate architecture through a trust lens, was 
demonstrated theoretically by considering an existing, though immature, UAS architecture under 
specific surveillance scenarios.  After the addition of trust-related tasks and information 
exchanges, additional knowledge is available to the operator (e.g. transition between operating 
modes, system confidence in its ability to operate effectively within a defined envelope, etc).  
This increased awareness may enable more realistic expectations and thus improve trust.  
Appropriate trust, in turn, should improve system effectiveness and enable transition from 
multiple operators on one UAV to one operator multiple UAVs. 
This qualitative evaluation, however, is of limited use in determining the full potential of 
a “trust lens approach” to system architecture.  A quantitative evaluation of system effectiveness 
before and after the inclusion of trust is necessary in order to fully address this research question. 
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5.2 Recommendations 
5.2.1 Develop Comprehensive Test Plan to Quantify Utility of Architecting Trust 
One of the main objectives of this thesis was to demonstrate the utility of architecting 
trust on a given UAS architecture.  However, a thorough test and evaluation was not 
accomplished due to time constraints and the immaturity of AFIT's multi-UAV implementation 
of BATCAM system.  Therefore, the research team recommends a follow-on study to develop a 
comprehensive test plan including detailed measures of performance, effectiveness, and 
suitability, to examine how the system performs before and after trust relationships are integrated 
into the architecture.  The test can be either conducted on the BATCAM UAS when it reaches a 
state of maturity that will allow sufficient test data to be collected, a similar single operator 
multi-UAV system, or any operationally relevant system with complex operator-automation 
interaction.  The collection and analysis of test data will ultimately prove whether mission 
effectiveness is enhanced by engineering for appropriate trust. 
5.2.2 Extend Trust Model to Show Team Collaboration  
 The notional trust model that was developed in Chapter 3 represents one operator 
interacting with a particular system.  However, most military engagements are never this simple.  
In real-world systems, multiple operators interact with one another and a variety of systems.  
Therefore, to extend the utility of this research, it would be beneficial to extend the trust model 
to incorporate team collaboration and the interdependencies of trust between different operators.  
A researcher may be able to use the Distributed Common Ground Systems (DCGS) or similar 
team environment, for the basis of their study of the trust interactions, interdependencies, and 
relationships in a collaborative atmosphere. 
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5.2.3 Perform HFE Study to Determine Most Effective Means to Convey Trust Data 
 Architecting for trust alone will not necessarily lead an operator to more appropriately 
rely on automation.  Instead, trust related data depicted in the architecture must be properly 
conveyed to the operator.  Jamieson, et al. (2008) conducted experiments and developed several 
display prototypes that represented trust factor information (i.e. displaying system confidence) to 
the user in different ways.  The data they collected during the experiment indicated that the 
manner in which the data was presented affected the participants’ reliance upon the system 
(Jamieson, Wang, & Neyedli, 2008).  Therefore, the system interface design should account for 
these factors and displays trust factors in a manner which induces appropriate operator reliance 
upon the system.  This research group recommends a human factors engineering (HFE) study of 
how to appropriately convey trust-related data to UAV operators (e.g. visual, auditory, size/color 
of display, etc.). 
5.2.4 Develop State Transition Diagram for Evolution of Human/Machine Trust 
 The main goal of this research effort was to incorporate trust into system architecture in 
order to foster appropriate trust.  As operators interact with systems repeatedly over time, the 
trust relationship should evolve to where the user has appropriate trust in the system and is not 
misusing or disusing the system.  The goal in applying a trust lens is to minimize this evolution 
time and to drive the operator to the appropriate trust state.  Therefore, the authors recommend a 
study to develop a state transition diagram or similar temporal flow diagram that describes the 
evolution of operator/automation trust over time for a specific system and/or set of scenarios. 
5.2.5 Determine Appropriate Degree of Transparency 
 The authors of this research have advocated designing systems with transparency of 
automation to help facilitate appropriate trust.  However, the scope of this research did not allow 
determination of the most effective level or type of transparency.  For example, if transparency is 
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insufficient operators may not trust the system to produce a desired outcome.  Conversely, too 
much transparency of system behavior has the potential to overwhelm the operator with 
unnecessary information.  Previous research efforts have addressed similar concerns; for 
example, Cummings, et al. has measured the effects of different levels of automation on 
situational awareness and reliance (Cummings & Mitchell, 2008); (Cummings, Bruni, Mercier, 
& Mitchell, 2007).  However, the authors are not aware of any research that has attempted to 
balance the trust benefits of transparency with the limited processing ability of human operators.  
Therefore, the authors recommend a study to determine the degree of transparency that will best 
enhance mission effectiveness for a given system. 
5.2.6 Develop a Trust Profile  
 Reliance is a decision based largely on the trust attitude (Lee & See, Trust in Automation: 
Designing for Appropriate Reliance, 2004).  Prior studies have proposed methods to measure 
trust empirically (Jian, Bisantz, & Drury, 2000), yet have not attempted to predict differences in 
behavior based on the measured degree of trust.  Expected utility theory, meanwhile, contends 
that individuals tend to make different decisions in the same situation depending on their risk 
attitude (e.g. risk seeking, risk neutral, or risk averse.)  Since the need to trust is explicitly tied to 
the presence of uncertainty and risk in a given situation (Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, 
1998), it follows that an individual's inclination to trust may bear some relation to their risk 
attitude as described in utility theory, and hence affects their behavior. 
 Bhattacharya, et al.'s (1998) research on trust relates to utility theory in its attention to 
risk, but could be extended by developing a trust profile similar to that for risk in utility theory.  
In addition, a model of "trust patterns" then could be developed and applied to identify the 
tendencies of individuals with different trust patterns, and modify the behavior of automation 
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(e.g. amount and type of information presented to a specific operator) in order to elicit 
appropriate trust from specific individuals in response.  Adjusting for individual inclination to 
trust will negate one of the limitations identified during the development of the trust model 
discussed in Chapter 3.  If applied correctly with the present trust model during system design, 
engineers may be better able to induce appropriate trust regardless of individual inclination. 
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Appendix A – Trust Lens Implementation Guide 
 
 While the research presented here was inspired by the need for improved UAV 
automation, the authors believe the “trust lens” can be applied to improve the effectiveness of 
any system in which humans interact with complex automation.  Thus, systems engineers, 
program managers, and the like may wonder how they can apply the trust model presented here 
to their specific program.  The following quick reference guide is provided as a starting point for 
considering trust during system architecture development.  It relates the trust model elements 
most immediately relevant for consideration during each architecture development step.  Keep in 
mind that the architecture development steps are iterative, not sequential. 
Steps 1 & 2: Determine Scope and View 
- Identify human/machine relationships and dependencies 
- Plan for impact of context on the operator’s trust in the system  (see sections 2.2.1.1 and 
3.2.2) 
o Consider existing/desired social and organizational context (see section 2.2.2) 
o Begin to shape individual context by identifying manpower, personnel, and 
training (MPT) requirements (see sections 2.5 and 3.2.2) 
Steps 3 & 4: Determine Data Required & Collect, Organize, Correlate and Store the Data 
- Use scenario data (e.g. sequence diagrams) to model and predict operator perception (e.g. 
SA, time stress) under expected conditions (see sections 2.2.1.5, 3.2.1, 4.3.2.3 and 
4.4.3.3) 
- Design automation to elicit realistic expectations by providing appropriate transparency 
and predictability of system state (see sections 2.2.2, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3) 
Steps 5 & 6: Conduct Analysis and Document Results 
- Validate or refine MPT requirements that affect context, scenarios that affect operator 
perception models, and design requirements to improve automation transparency and 
predictability 
- Build architecture, incorporating tasks and information flows identified in steps 3 & 4 
- Refine and finalize training objectives and scenarios to represent system behavior in 
operationally realistic conditions 
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Appendix B – Glossary 
 
Ability: the group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable the trustee to influence 
the domain. (Lee & See, 2004) 
 
Adaptive Automation: automation that adapts to the needs of the operator in a given situation 
by altering its behavior, e.g. shifts from fully automated to compliance-oriented to minimal 
decision support, when the system reaches predetermined states 
 
Appropriateness of trust: the relationship between the true capabilities of the agent and the 
level of trust  (Lee & See, 2004) 
 
Attitude: an affective evaluation of beliefs that guides people to adopt a particular intention.  
(Lee & See, 2004) 
 
Automation: the technology that actively selects data, transforms information, makes decisions, 
or controls processes.  (Lee & See, 2004) 
 
Automation bias: a decision bias that occurs when operators become over-reliant on the 
automation and do not verify the accuracy of automated recommendations. (Cummings, Bruni, 
Mercier, & Mitchell, 2007) 
 
Battlespace: The environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to 
successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. (Joint Pub 1-02, 
2001) 
 
Belief: any cognitive content held as true (Dictionary.com, 2006) 
 
Benevolence: the extent to which the intents and motivations of the trustee are aligned with 
those of the trustor. (Lee & See, 2004) 
 
Calibration: the correspondence between a person’s trust in the automation and the 
automation’s capabilities. (Lee & Moray, Trust, self-confidence, and operators' adaptation to 
automation, 1994) (Muir, 1987) 
 
Capability: the ability to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may not be 
accompanied by an intention.) (Joint Pub 1-02, 2001) 
 
Complacency: overreliance resulting in failure to monitor the “raw” information sources that 
provide input to the automated system. (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, Situation 
Awareness, Mental Workload, and Trust in Automation: Viable, Empirically Supported 
Cognitive Engineering Constructs, 2008) 
 
Compliance-oriented automation: automation indicates an abnormal situation, and the 
operators act in response to this indicator.  (Lee & See, 2004) 
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Confidence: a level of expectation associated with a particular prediction or belief. 
 
Context, individual: a specific person’s history of interactions with the trustee, as well as their 
general inclination to trust, which can vary from one individual to the next. (Lee & See, 2004) 
 
Context, organizational: interactions between people that inform them about the 
trustworthiness of others, which can include reputation and gossip. (Lee & See, 2004)   
 
Context, situational: interactions between people and the environment and current state of the 
system 
 
Context, social: a set of social norms and expectations that influence trust through shared 
educational and life experiences associated with cultural differences or distinct groups of 
workers. 
 
Controls: the rules, doctrine, regulations, or other documents that prescribe how 
an action is to take place, what course the activity must follow, and, what form or 
format is expected/required for the result. (DoDAF Version 2.0, 2008) 
 
Dependability: the extent to which the trustee can be relied upon. (Muir, 1994) 
 
Disuse: failures that occur when people reject the capabilities of automation. (Lee & See, 2004) 
 
Effectiveness: adequate to accomplish a purpose; producing the intended or expected result 
(Dictionary.com, 2006) 
 
Environment: the aggregate of surrounding things, conditions, or influences; surroundings; 
milieu. (Dictionary.com, 2006) 
 
Expectation: belief about (or mental picture of) the future (Dictionary.com, 2006) 
 
Expected Utility Theorem: predicts that the "betting preferences" of people with regard to 
uncertain outcomes can be described by a mathematical relation which takes into account the 
size of a payout, the probability of occurrence, risk aversion, and the different utility of the same 
payout to people with different assets or personal preferences.  (Wikipedia contributors, 2009) 
 
Experience: knowledge or practical wisdom gained from what one has observed, encountered, 
or undergone (Dictionary.com, 2006) 
 
Faith: a judgment that the trustee can be relied on, even though specific actions and their 
outcomes may be unknown at the time.  Also, a closure against doubt in the face of an uncertain 
future. (Muir, 1994) 
 
Fiduciary Responsibility: an assumption that the trustee will act appropriately when trustee 
competence is unknown.  e.g. An operator assumes a system will meet its design-based 
performance criteria when it is operating as intended. (Muir, 1994) 
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General Inclination:  the inherent tendency a specific individual has to place trust in an 
unknown system  
 
Human System Integration:  The interdisciplinary technical and management processes for 
integrating human considerations within and across all system elements; an essential enabler to 
systems engineering practice (INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook) 
 
Importance: the value of the expected outcome to the trustor. (Bhattacharya, Devinney, & 
Pillutla, 1998) 
 
Information element: a formalized representation of information subject to an operational 
process (e.g., the information content that is required to be exchanged between nodes). (DoDAF 
Version 1.5, 2007) 
 
Information exchange: an act of exchanging information between two distinct operational 
nodes.  Characteristics of the act include the information element that needs to be 
exchanged and its attributes (e.g., Scope), as well as attributes associated with the exchange (e.g., 
Transaction Type). (DoDAF Version 1.5, 2007) 
 
Inputs: the triggers that cause an activity to occur, along with data or information 
needed to perform the desired action. (DoDAF Version 2.0, 2008) 
 
Integrity: the degree to which the trustee adheres to a set of principles the trustor finds 
acceptable. (Lee & See, 2004) 
 
Interaction Time: the time it takes for a human to interact with the automation to raise the 
performance to an acceptable level.  (Cummings & Mitchell, 2008) 
 
Interface: a common boundary or interconnection between systems, equipment, concepts, or 
human beings.  (Dictionary.com, 2006) 
 
Mechanisms: see Resources. 
 
Mental Workload: the relation between the function relating the mental resources by a task and 
those resources available to be supplied by the human operator. (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & 
Wickens, Situation Awareness, Mental Workload, and Trust in Automation: Viable, Empirically 
Supported Cognitive Engineering Constructs, 2008) 
 
Misuse: failures that occur when people inadvertently violate critical assumptions and rely on 
automation inappropriately.  (Lee & See, 2004) 
 
Operator Perception: an operator's intuitive or mental representation of certain factors that 
affect expectations and attitudes 
 
Outcome: An end result; a consequence (Dictionary.com, 2006) 
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Outputs: the results of activity performance. These can be outputs of products, 
services, or requirements for further action, or outcomes (i.e. demonstration that an 
action has produced a desired change.) (DoDAF Version 2.0, 2008) 
 
Performance: the competency or expertise as demonstrated by its ability to achieve the 
operator’s goals. (Lee & See, 2004) 
 
Persistence: an expectation of constancy, which, for example, allows the operator to construct a 
mental model of the automation through experience interacting with it.  (Muir, 1994) 
 
Predictability: visibility of specific behaviors, or performance, that allow operators to judge 
automation based on its ability to deliver consistent and desirable results. 
 
Process: the degree to which the automation’s algorithms are appropriate for the situation and 
able to achieve the operator’s goals. (Lee & See, 2004) 
 
Purpose: the degree to which the automation is being used within the realm of the designer’s 
intent. (Lee & See, 2004) 
 
Quale: a term used in philosophy to describe the subjective quality of conscious experience. 
(Wikipedia contributors , 2009) 
 
Queuing Time: the amount of time a decision is prolonged due to the presence of multiple tasks.  
 
Reliance: a behavior representing the operator’s intention or willingness to act, in the form of a 
decision to use or not to use automation.  
 
Resolution: how precisely a judgment of trust differentiates levels of automation capability. 
(Cohen, Parasuraman, & Freeman, 1998) 
 
Resources: those things that assist in performance of the activity. These can be physical, logical, 
technological, or human resources. (DoDAF Version 2.0, 2008) 
 
Risk: exposure to the chance of injury or loss.  (Dictionary.com, 2006) 
 
Self-Confidence: confidence in one's own judgment, ability, power, etc. (Dictionary.com, 2006) 
 
Situational Awareness:  perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time 
and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near 
future.  (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, Situation Awareness, Mental Workload, and Trust 
in Automation: Viable, Empirically Supported Cognitive Engineering Constructs, 2008)   
 
Specificity: the degree to which trust is associated with a particular component or aspect of the 
trustee.  (Lee & See, 2004) 
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Specificity, functional: the differentiation of functions, subfunctions, and modes of automation.  
e.g. With high functional specificity, a person’s trust reflects capabilities of specific subfunctions 
and modes. Low functional specificity means the person’s trust reflects the capabilities of the 
entire system. (Lee & See, 2004) 
 
Specificity, temporal: changes in trust as a function of the situation or over time. e.g. High 
temporal specificity means that a person’s trust reflects moment-to-moment fluctuations in 
automation capability, whereas low temporal specificity means that the trust reflects only long-
term changes in automation capability. (Lee & See, 2004) 
 
Stakes: the consequences of a mistake, or, similar to importance, the value to the operator of 
achieving a desired outcome. 
 
Strength: some degree of confidence in the expected outcome.  (Bhattacharya, Devinney, & 
Pillutla, 1998) 
 
Suitability: the quality of having the properties that are right for a specific purpose  
(Dictionary.com, 2006) 
 
System nodes: containers for service software items along with the corresponding infrastructure 
software items and physical computing resource items that enable their existence. A system node 
may contain one or many service, software, and hardware items.  (DoDAF Version 1.5, 2007) 
 
System State: the dynamic behaviors concerning the timing and sequencing of events that 
capture system performance characteristics of an executing system (DoDAF Version 1.5, 2007) 
 
Technical Competence: the trustor believes the trustee has the ability to perform the assigned 
task successfully.  (Muir, 1994) 
 
Time Stress: perceived cost of delay, e.g. when cost of delay is great, action is more imperative, 
even with high uncertainty about trust. (Cohen, Parasuraman, & Freeman, 1998) 
 
Training: to coach in or accustom to a mode of behavior or performance (Dictionary.com, 2006) 
 
Transparency: the full, accurate, and timely disclosure of information (Dictionary.com, 2006) 
 
Trust:  the attitude that an agent will help achieve an individual’s goals in a situation 
characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability.  (Lee & See, 2004) 
 
Trust Lens: an evaluation of systems architectures by a systems engineer, human factors 
engineer, or other professional to plan for appropriate trust relationships 
 
Uncertainty: consequences of alternative courses of action are not always known or predictable.  
(Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, 1998) 
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Unpredictability, apparent: inability to predict behavior due to interaction with an unstable 
environment, rather than the nature of the system itself. 
 
Unpredictability, inherent: inability to predict behavior due to the nature of the system or 
automation. 
 
Use: refers to the situations where an operators places appropriate trust in the system; i.e. does 
not misuse or disuse the automation. 
 
Wait Time: the expected amount of time a task or decision will delayed before an operator 
addresses it. 
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